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Abstract
Emergency responders have suffered from a lack of cross-agency radio communications
for the past three decades. After numerous firefighters died in the terrorist attacks of
September 11, partially due to a lack of interoperability with police officers on the scene,
the federal government began implementing policies, programs, and funding to improve
interoperability amongst state and local first responders. This thesi explores the scope and
the effectiveness of many of the federal efforts towards interoperability that have
occurred between 2001 and 2006.
Since 2001, the federal government has made progress in a number of areas relating to
the national interoperability of first responders. These include: creating and reorganizing
interoperability programs, such as SAFECOM within DHS; promoting open standards for
equipment manufacturers; freeing radio spectrum for first responder use; and partially
funding the purchase of new, interoperable communication equipment through grant
programs and national initiatives. However, these efforts were slow to start, with the
majority of progress only occurring within the past two years. Furthermore, the
government has not set broad interoperability goals, and there are continuing questions
about the amount of financial support that the government has offered and will continue
to offer towards the problem. The European Union and the U.S. military have both dealt
with interoperability as well, and comparisons between these two entities and the U.S.
federal government show that a lack of interoperability is both complex and has some
possible solutions that remain untested in the United States.
Five recommendations are presented to help the federal government forge a path forward.
The government, through both the Department of Homeland Security and Congress,
should: encourage collaboration between local public safety agencies; encourage better
industry participation through equipment endorsements and public/private partnerships;
create an interoperability grants program within DHS; prepare for a large increase in
funding requests by 2009; and, establish a National Interoperability Goal with measurable
results.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence McCray
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Chapter 1 - The Need for Interoperable Communications
April 19, 1995 - At 9:02 am, a truck bomb with over 4,000 pounds of explosives
detonated outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
The front face and top floors of the building collapsed, over 800 people were injured, and
167 people were killed. Numerous state, local, and federal emergency responders quickly
converged on the scene of the bombing, ready to move in and save lives. The Oklahoma
City Fire Department, as well as surrounding area fire departments and FEMA search and
rescue teams, began to scout the building for survivors. The Oklahoma City Police
Department, the Oklahoma county sheriff, and Oklahoma National Guard units secured
the perimeter around the building and assisted with the rescue efforts. The Emergency
Medical Services Agency set up a triage center for helping the injured and getting serious
cases to the local hospital. The FBI almost immediately began a criminal investigation of
the bombing.
In the first hours of the response, communication between the dozen on-site
agencies was problematic, at best. Fragmented communication frequencies and
conflicting standards meant that police officers and firefighters could not use their radios
to talk to one another or communicate with federal agencies. Cellular phone networks
were quickly overloaded, and landline phones were impractical for responders moving
throughout the destroyed building. Face-to-face communication and designated runners
were used extensively to transmit messages, but these were inefficient and limited the
flow of information to off-site incident commanders (Manzi, Powers, and Zeterlund
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2002). In short, no system was available to efficiently and effectively allow the numerous
response agencies to coordinate their life-saving efforts.
April 20, 1999 - Between 11:19 am and 12:05 pm, Eric Harris and Dylan
Klebold, two gun-wielding sixteen-year-old students, went on a killing spree through
Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. In the end, the two perpetrators killed
themselves, but not before murdering 13 others and injuring dozens more. As in
Oklahoma City, the emergency response was massive. Almost immediately following the
first 911 call, a number of paramedics, firefighters and police officers arrived on scene.
They were subsequently joined by almost 1,000 other responders including sheriff
deputies, SWAT team members, medics and, later, FBI agents. Unlike the Oklahoma
City bombing, however, the response was not just a search and rescue mission. Because it
was unclear, until late in the afternoon, how many perpetrators were in the school and
whether or not they were all dead, responders approached the school as if it still
contained unknown threats. For much of that day, many of the emergency responders on
the scene were anticipating further loss of life.
As the number of agencies on scene increased, so did the magnitude of the
communication problems. Responding agencies from different jurisdictions were using
incompatible communication equipment. Some systems were analog, while others were
digital. Some used proprietary Motorola standards, while others used proprietary Ericsson
standards. Almost all operated in isolated frequency bands. These incompatibilities
"greatly increased the difficulty of establishing and maintaining effective incident
command" and hampered the joint SWAT response as officers entered the building
(Rosegrant and Howitt 2001). Said one Jefferson County Sheriff Officer, "I cannot
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overemphasize how great a problem the incompatibility of our communications systems
was that day. [It] was almost unimaginable" (Rosegrant and Howitt 2001).
September 11, 2001 - At 8:46 am, a fuel-laden jetliner piloted by al-Qaeda
terrorists slammed into the middle of the north tower of the World Trade Center in New
York City. At 9:03 am, a second terrorist-flown jetliner collided with the south tower.
The force of the impacts eventually caused both towers to collapse, but not before New
York Fire Department, New York Police Department, and New York/New Jersey Port
Authority officers mounted a massive search and rescue operation in the Twin Towers.
On that tragic day, the firefighters, police officers, and Port Authority officers that
struggled to evacuate the burning towers lacked the ability to talk to each other via radios.
Their three separate communication systems were technically incompatible and operated
on different frequencies. As a result, there was limited coordination between the three
agencies during the evacuation. Areas that had been searched by firefighters were
searched again by police. Rescue operations were conducted without knowledge or
regard for nearby resources from other agencies. Most tragically, this lack of
interoperable communication was at least partially responsible for the deaths of some of
the roughly 200 firefighters that perished in the north tower, because they never received
the message broadcasted on NYPD radio channels that the collapse of that tower was
imminent (Kean, Hamilton, and et al. 2004).
August 29, 2005 - Hurricane Katrina, a Category 4 storm, ravaged the Gulf Coast
and caused the levees surrounding New Orleans to break, flooding the city. This storm
was exceptional, both in its ferocity and its lethality. The death toll from the hurricane
and the subsequent flooding in Louisiana is estimated at 1,287, with most of those
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fatalities occurring in and around New Orleans. While it is often criticized as being too
little too late, there was a huge response by federal, state, and local emergency responders
throughout the gulf region. Coast Guard, National Guard, and police helicopters helped
ferry stranded victims from their rooftops. Paramedics treated the wounded and
dehydrated. Department of Homeland Security officials attempted to coordinate relief
efforts and maintain the flow of supplies. The emergency response lasted for weeks, with
many responders still on the ground long after the waters had receded.
In the initial days of the response, there were significant problems with
communication, especially between local and federal responders. According to the House
subcommittee investigating the response to Katrina, a lack of interoperability meant that
"first responders in helicopters could not talk to crews patrolling in boats, and National
Guard Commanders in Louisiana and Mississippi had to use runners to relay orders"l
(Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to
Hurricane Katrina 2006). This lack of communication led to a significant slowdown in
rescue operations and has prompted many critics to question if interoperability could
have saved some of the thousands of people who succumbed to flood waters along the
gulf coast.
Two common themes bind the above incidents. First, they were all large-scale
events that required a massive emergency response from a number of agencies. Federal,
state, and local responders from a number of disciplines and jurisdictions were involved
in each. Second, these responders were not able to communicate with each other via
' These compatibility problems were exacerbated by a lack of operability. In many cases the storm had
knocked out the communication infrastructure that could have at least provided some communication
between the various response agencies.
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radios. This lack of interoperable communication substantially increased the danger to
both emergency personnel and civilians, and in some cases led to devastating results.
Interoperability between emergency responder communication systems has been a
recognized need in the public safety community for over 30 years. However, it was only
in the post-9/ 11 era that the federal government became heavily involved in finding a
solution2. Billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of working hours have been put
towards giving first responders the ability to talk outside their own agencies. But, despite
numerous attempts to fix the problem from all levels of government, interoperability
remains an elusive goal. In a 2006 survey by the National Governor's Association, 83%
of state Homeland Security directors listed "Developing interoperable communications
for first responders" as their number one priority (National Governors Association 2006).
This shows that a lack of interoperability remains one of the most critical and pressing
issues facing the emergency response community today.
Now, as the country nears the fifth anniversary of the September 11 attacks, two
pertinent questions arise. First, has the federal government implemented good policies
towards emergency responder interoperability, and second, is the United States
sufficiently positioned to finally solve this problem in a reasonable amount of time? The
answer to the first is generally yes - the federal government has made useful policy
decisions that are helping to create interoperability in states and localities. But as for the
second question, the outlook is not so clear. There are still many hurdles to overcome
before interoperability is pervasive, and swift action must be taken to speed the process
along.
2 The United States military dealt with issues of interservice interoperability much earlier, but their efforts
had little effect on challenges faced by the public safety community. For more information on the military
efforts towards interoperability, see Chapter 5.
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Interoperability: A Complex Problem
Interoperability is a simple concept with hundreds of complexities. The general
definition of interoperability is responders from different agencies being able to talk to
each other. However, inside that simple definition lurks a number of difficult questions.
Does interoperability mean that every firefighter at the scene of an incident should be
able to talk to every police officer? Or is it sufficient that the incident commanders from
each agency can communicate? If a radio system takes one second to relay a message to
different radio system, is it interoperable? What about five seconds? Twenty seconds?
Does achieving interoperability require the transmission of data as well as voice? Does it
include communication with federal response agencies as well as state and local officers?
National Guard and military? State and local elected officials, such as a mayor or
governor?
Just as important is the question of the level and consistency of interoperability.
Oklahoma City, Columbine, September 11, and Hurricane Katrina were catastrophic and
well-publicized examples of the need for interoperable communication. But there are
numerous other small-scale examples of state and local emergency responders needing to
communicate with each other and not being able to (National Task Force on
Interoperability 2005). These occur especially near the edges of jurisdictions, or when
incidents become too large to be handled by a single response agency. Is interoperability
a necessary component of day-to-day emergency response, or is it only required in the
event of major catastrophes?
Further complicating matters is the fact that every response agency has different
interoperability problems and different ways of approaching them. There are over 60,000
emergency response agencies in the United States, at the local, state, tribal, and federal
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level. These agencies, which own and operate over 90% of the nation's public safety
wireless infrastructure, are largely autonomous and have the freedom to make their own
decisions regarding what equipment to buy, what technology to use, and what policies to
implement. The individual state and local response agencies also have the sole authority
to decide which other agencies they want to partner with to establish interoperability. The
federal government has some power to set interoperability guidelines, but at the end of
the day it is up to the states and localities to determine their own level of interoperability
(Boyd 2005).
Interoperability can mean a number of things to a number of people, but in order
to facilitate a meaningful discussion, bounds must be placed on its definition. First, unless
explicitly stated otherwise, "interoperability" in this paper refers to wireless
communications interoperability. Specifically, this refers to the ability of emergency
responders to share information via voice and data signals over radio waves. There are
federal efforts underway to make other types of information exchange between response
agencies compatible, such as the development of common credentials and badges to
facilitate rapid responder identity verification (Torres Interview 2006). These efforts are
sometimes also referred to as "interoperability," but they fall outside the focus of this
thesis.
Second, interoperability, in its ideal form, encompasses a number of features. For
a communication system to be considered truly interoperable it should:
* Allow communication with all other local emergency response agencies which
have overlapping or adjacent jurisdictions;
* Allow communication with all emergency response agencies from higher levels of
government, including the surrounding county, state, and federal agencies;
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* Provide on-demand service without requiring the deployment of special
equipment at the scene of an emergency;
* Provide real-time service that does not suffer from noticeable delays;
* Provide secure service that can adequately direct the flow of information; and,
* Provide a transparent end-user experience, which does not require significant time
to access interoperable functionality.
Systems which only meet some of the above criteria are still valuable, but in this paper
they will be referred to as "partially interoperable." Only systems that meet all six of the
above criteria will be considered fully interoperable.
Additionally, the terms "emergency responders" and "first responders" will be
used interchangeably to describe the various public law enforcement, firefighting, and
medical teams that might respond in the first few hours of an emergency. There are some
questions in both the literature and in the response community about whether a building's
security officers are "first responders" or if HAZMAT teams, for example, should be
termed "second responders," since they arrive after a response has already started
(Doherty Interview 2006). While these distinctions may be academically interesting, they
only serve to muddle an already confusing issue. For this paper, a first responder is any
public safety official who contributes on the scene of an emergency.
The Reasons for a Lack of Interoperability
In today's technology-driven world, interoperability seems like it should be easy.
After all, cellular telephones made by different companies and operating on different
service provider networks are able to communicate without incident. Laptop computers
with wireless adapters have no problem communicating with the WiFi router at home, in
the office, or at the corner coffee shop. Commercial, private, and military aviators are
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able to communicate with any nearby control tower or aircraft. Why, then, is it so
difficult for a firefighter and paramedic from the same town to talk to one another?
The National Task Force on Interoperability3 cites five general reasons for a lack
of interoperability: incompatible and aging communications equipment, limited and
fragmented funding, limited and fragmented planning and coordination, limited and
fragmented radio spectrum, and limited equipment standards (National Task Force on
Interoperability 2005). These five causes are widely accepted as the major hurdles that a
response agency must overcome when trying to achieve interoperability with other
response agencies4 . However, because each locality inevitably faces unique
interoperability problems, the importance of each hurdle varies from agency to agency.
Each of these causes can impact an agency's ability to be interoperable.
The first cause, incompatible and aging communications equipment, is probably
the most frequently cited reason that responders lack interoperability. Incompatibility can
be caused by a number of things, but in this context it most often refers to the
implementation of proprietary and incompatible communication protocols. For example,
when Motorola engineers a radio system, they must implement a protocol that designates
how signals are sent and received between handheld radios. Motorola can adopt any
protocol it wants, and unless it uses open standards, this protocol will probably not
interface with the protocols of a Motorola competitor, such as Alcatel5. Thus, different
emergency response agencies with radio systems manufactured by two different
3 The National Task Force on Interoperability, formed by the National Institute of Justice in 2001, was
designed to help educate state and local elected officials on the challenges to and benefits of achieving
interoperability. Although the NTFI is no longer active, their work is still updated and distributed by the
NIJ. More information on the NTFI can be found at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/commtech/ntfi/
4 The majority of federal documents refer to these five causes as the definitive reason that a lack of
interoperability exists.
5This problem of conflicting and proprietary protocols can be found throughout the emergency radio
manufacturing industry, and is not solely representative of Motorola and Alcatel.
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companies will most likely not be able to talk to each other6. The age of many systems is
also partly to blame. Many of the communication systems being used by responders were
purchased over 30 years ago, when interoperability was not a recognized concern for the
user community or vendors (Boyd 2005). A number of systems that are still in use today
were simply never designed with interoperability in mind.
Upgrading or replacing systems is a possibility, but it would be very expensive. A
1998 study put the cost for full nation-wide replacement at $18.3 billion7 , which does not
take into account the extra cost for training, installation and maintenance of new systems
(Public Safety Wireless Network 1998). Although there is some federal funding
available, the majority of this cost would fall on state and local organizations. Limited
and fragmented funding from local, state, and federal sources impedes interoperability by
making it difficult to fund projects and purchase new equipment.
Even with unlimited funding, interoperability is not achievable without a concrete
planning and governance model. Agencies from neighboring and overlapping
jurisdictions frequently fail to meet with each other to discuss planned equipment
purchases. This may be due to a number of reasons, from a desire to remain autonomous
and retain organizational hierarchies, to jurisdictional rivalries, to a simple lack of
foresight (Mayer-Sch6nberger 2005). Without consistent planning and coordination,
interoperability efforts will be inefficient at best and failures at worse.
6 This problem is compounded by the fact that equipment manufacturers may be reluctant to abandon
proprietary protocols. The use of incompatible protocols tends to lock emergency response agencies into
purchasing equipment from a single firm, in order to maintain backwards compatibility with previously
purchased components.
This number comes from a 1998 report, which is considered out of date now, despite being the most
recent estimate available. The value of $18.3 billion is used here to convey a general sense of the enormity
of cost associated with replacing the radio communication infrastructure in this country.
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The fourth reason that agencies lack interoperability is fragmented spectrum. As
can be seen in Figure 1-1, emergency responder radios currently operate in ten isolated
frequency bands on the electromagnetic spectrum. Because of the physical properties of
radio waves, no antenna is able to transmit or receive in all ten bands. Thus, if two
adjacent response agencies operate in different bands, their radios will most likely be
unable to communicate with each other.
138-144 406-420 764-776* 806-824 Frequency
Public Safety 25-50 14.174 220-222 450.470 794 a.806* 851 869 (MIlM7
Spectrum Bands [
I' 
uu IMi 11-I" IR iU
I I I I I I
30kHz 3MHz 30MHz 300MHz 3GHz 30GHz
Figure 1-1 The 10 isolated bands of the public safety spectrum
Source: (Kentucky Wireless Interoperability Executive Committee 2004)
Finally, the fifth cause of interoperability woes - a lack of standards - relates
closely to the incompatible equipment problem. Many of the currently deployed systems
use proprietary standards because satisfactory open standards have not been widely
available or supported until recently. The main open wireless emergency communication
standard is known as Project 25 and it has been in development for 15 year. However,
until late 2005, only one small part of that standard had been defined and its
implementation across systems was inconsistent (Orr 2005). Some systems claiming to
conform to the existing open standards still cannot interface with each other (Lipowicz
2005). Without widely supported and technically sufficient open standards, equipment
manufacturers will have to rely on proprietary and incompatible communication
protocols, which stymie interoperability.
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When faced with these five main hurdles to interoperability, the temptation arises
to immediately start looking for a silver-bullet solution. Unfortunately, no such solution
exists. Having every emergency responder everywhere use the same radio system would
conquer the technical problems of incompatible equipment and fragmented spectrum, but
this solution is impractical for a number of reasons. It would be prohibitively expensive,
require massive coordination by thousands of state and local agencies, not fit the needs of
any one specific agency, and rob the state and local agencies of choice. Cellular
telephones could be used to maintain communication between incident commanders from
different agencies, but cell phones lack the ability to broadcast to multiple responders at
once. Also, the telephone network can quickly become overloaded during an emergency
and it lacks the robustness, reliability, and efficiency required for emergency operations
(National Task Force on Interoperability 2005). Crosspatch and repeater technology can
be helpful for bridging existing communication system, but no single piece of technology
is right for every agency. Perhaps most important, no technological solution can be
effective without coordination on the part of responders.
Any solution to the lack of interoperability must be multifaceted. It must
incorporate a systems-of-systems approach that recognizes the need to blend existing and
new technology. It must address all five of the causes of lack of interoperability and take
into account the need for training, planning, and cooperation between different levels of
government. Finally, it must be supported by the people who use it. If an interoperability
solution does not meet the needs of first responders, it will be wasted.
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The Federal Role: A Look Ahead
This chapter introduced the idea of interoperability and raised the question of
federal involvement in solving the problem. The rest of this thesis will focus on the
federal government's efforts to increase interoperability between emergency responders,
and detail the work that still needs to be done.
Chapter 2 will focus on the technical aspects of interoperability. It will give a
detailed overview of how emergency responder radio communication works, and discuss
some of the short-term and long-term technologies that the federal government is
advocating as potential solutions to interoperability issues.
Chapter 3 will detail the programs, policies, and organizational changes that the
federal government has used to address the problems of interoperability. This chapter will
carefully examine Project SAFECOM, the umbrella program for all federal
interoperability efforts, which resides in the Department of Homeland Security.
Chapter 4 will provide analysis of these federal efforts, with a critical look at the
progress that has been made across the nation. It will also provide some inspection of the
federal money that has been put towards interoperability since September 11, and explore
where the responsibility for solving the problem lies.
Chapter 5 will contrast the United States efforts against two very different cases
of achieving interoperability - the public safety community in the European Union, and
interservice interoperability within the U.S. military.
Finally, Chapter 6 will present recommendations for improving federal policies
towards interoperability, and offer some solutions for further reducing the interoperability
problems that emergency responders face.
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Chapter 2- Technology's Role in Interoperability
Technology is a critical component of the interoperability problem, and it is often
the first one that is addressed by policymakers. All wireless public safety communication
networks use some type of specialized technology, including transmitters, towers,
repeaters and handheld radios. For any proposed interoperability solution, the technical
details of an underlying system must be taken into account before that solution can be
effectively deployed. While governance and policies play just as important a role in
establishing interoperability, it is, at its core, a problem that is based on technology.
There are a number of proposed technical solutions that address some or all of the
causes of noninteroperability. These include a radio that automatically tunes in to the
frequencies of the radios around it, a vehicle-deployed cross-patch system that
dynamically links two base stations together at the scene of an incident, and a
retransmitter that takes audio from one radio system and broadcasts it out on another.
Some manufacturers have even proposed using internet protocol (IP) as a common
interface between existing radios (Grimes 2005). The distinction and details of the
various solutions can quickly become overwhelming, especially when looking for cross-
cutting and comprehensive technological solutions. Further complicating matters is the
fact that the state of available technology is constantly in flux. Some of the needed
devices are available now, but some will not be ready for deployment for many years to
come. Some systems are simple and proven, while others are experimental and require
frequent expert tweaking.
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Unfortunately, engineers have not yet developed a silver-bullet technology that
will solve the nation's interoperability woes. However, they have developed a number of
products and engineering concepts that attempt to alleviate parts of the problems. This
chapter will first explain the basic technology underlying emergency responder radios. It
will then examine some of the solutions that do exist and will analyze their uses and
effectiveness. Finally, it will look at long-term technical solutions that are currently in
development, and evaluate these solutions against present needs.
Emergency Radios: A Primer
Before examining the possible technical solutions to the interoperability problem,
it is important to understand how radios, and specifically emergency radios, currently
work. All wireless radio communication occurs through the transmission of oscillating
radio waves. Each radio wave is characterized by frequency and amplitude8. These
frequencies all fall somewhere within the radiocommunication spectrum, which is a
subset of the electromagnetic spectrum with wavelengths that range between 0-300 GHz.
Not all frequencies within the radiocommunication spectrum are created equal.
Physical properties of different radio waves make some frequencies more useful for
certain applications. For example, firefighter communication systems benefit from using
lower frequencies because these frequencies are better able to penetrate buildings and are
less susceptible to diffraction and distortion (Frazier, Hooper, and et al. 2003). The
choice of frequency also determines how much data can be transmitted in a given amount
of time. Generally, higher frequency transmissions indicate higher bandwidth and more
information flow, because more data can be packed into each second of transmission.
8 Frequency, or the number of cycles per second, is measured in Hertz. Amplitude, or the strength or power
of a wave, is measured in Watts.
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This is why FM radio, operating in the MHz range, transmits higher-fidelity music than
AM radio, which operates in the kHz range (Manner 2003).
Radio waves are radiated through space by a transmitting antenna, and are then
intercepted by antennas that are designed to receive signals within that range of
frequencies. The type of antenna determines the radio's functionality. Some antennas,
such as those found on FM radios, are able to tune into multiple frequencies. Other
antennas, such as those found on walkie-talkies and cellular telephones, are able to both
transmit and receive radio waves, although only some can do so simultaneously.
A given radio will operate on a specific frequency or within a range of
frequencies. The frequency can be subdivided into a number of voice channels which can
range in size from about 5 kHz to 50 kHz, depending on the type of radio and the
bandwidth of the frequency. So even if a radio is only able to receive signals between 720
and 721 MHz, it could still easily be tuned to 200 separate channels in that range.
Intuitively, as the frequency increases, the number of available channels increase, so
comparatively low-frequency radios operating between 800 and 810 kHz would only be
able to squeeze out two distinct voice channels.
There are two main types of first responder radio systems: conventional analog
and digital trunk systems (National Institute of Justice 2002). Both of these types of
systems can suffer from a lack of interoperability. Analog systems are much older and
use more simplistic architectures9 . Responders on analog systems tune their radios to the
frequency channel they wish to talk on, and they can then communicate with other
responders within their agency that are on that channel. In most municipalities, channels
9 Conventional analog systems are generally used only in smaller cities, towns, and rural areas. The
majority of large cities have upgraded to digital trunked systems.
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are designated for specific uses. For example, one channel might be designated for
communication with the dispatcher while another is designated for incident response or
ad-hoc communication with responders in the immediate area. Some larger organizations,
such as metropolitan police and fire departments, reserve additional channels for incident
commanders, detectives, HAZMAT teams, forensic units, and other working groups
(Doherty Interview 2006). By restricting communication to appropriate channels,
emergency responders are able to communicate with who they need to, when they need
to, within their own organizations.
Conventional analog radio systems have several limitations, especially when they
are used by large organizations. Generally, with analog systems, a given channel cannot
have more than one user transmitting at a time. If two responders simultaneously
attempted to contact a dispatch center, one would have to wait until the other was
finished. While this problem is not serious in cases of two or three simultaneous
transmissions, it grows considerably when an incident has hundreds of responders on
scene. Compounding the problem is the fact that most conventional radios only operate in
a half-duplex mode - they cannot receive communication when they are transmitting.
Compared to a full-duplex device, such as a telephone or digital radio, half-duplex radios
can result in missed communications and inefficiency.
Digital trunked systems are the other major type of radio used by first responders.
These devices were first introduced in the late 1980s and have experienced increased
popularity as cities upgrade their communication systems. Instead of designating specific
channels within a frequency band for specific uses, trunked radios use a central computer
to assign users to a "talk group". The computer then dynamically and transparently
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assigns an open channel from the "trunk" of available channels whenever a user needs to
communicate with his or her talk group. It then rebroadcasts that transmission on the
channels of the other users in the talk group. Thus, communications between the same set
of individuals might be seamlessly occurring over several different physical channels.
The user does not have to fiddle with frequencies or wait for the channel to clear before
transmitting - the computer handles it all.
Unfortunately, with the increased efficiency comes the increased complexity of
the system. Digital trunked systems require more infrastructure and maintenance, which
leads to higher cost. They also require a separate channel for system messages that
coordinate which users are communicating with each other. In areas where the available
channels are limited, it might be difficult to justify the sparing of an entire channel for
control signals. Finally, digital trunked systems have traditionally used proprietary
protocols for synchronizing and transmitting communications. Thus, digital trunked
systems tend to require that all users are using equipment from the same manufacturer,
which presents additional barriers to interoperabilityl° .
Non-Technical Workarounds to Interoperability
In Chapter 1, there was a somewhat trivial solution to the interoperability
problem. If every emergency responder in the country uses the same radio system and
operates in the same frequency range, then they will all be able to talk to each other.
While this solution is impractical, both due to the cost of replacement and the
coordination that it would require, there are other non-technical workarounds that provide
some degree of interoperability at a minimum of cost. These workaround solutions are
10 For more on the interoperability problems posed by proprietary protocols, see Chapter 3.
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not as robust as those gained by introducing new technology, but they can serve as
temporary fixes for those jurisdictions that are unable to upgrade.
One easy solution is for response agencies in the same geographic area to trade
radios. Fire departments and police department could have extra radios that could be
handed out to members of the other agency during an incident. This would give at least
some of the responders (perhaps team leaders) the ability to communicate between
agencies. There are several downsides to this approach. Most notably, the radios would
take time to distribute, which could impact the efficiency of a response. The responders
would also have to carry an extra piece of bulky equipment and would not be able to have
communications on a joint channel or talking group.
Response agencies could also designate an "interoperability channel" throughout
a geographic region. For example, all responders in the state of Massachusetts would
know that Channel 24 in the 764 MHz frequency should be used for messages between
agencies. This approach can be simple to implement, but it requires that all radios operate
in the same frequency band, and have the same communication protocols. This approach
also inevitably leads to a very congested interoperability channel during a major event,
and prevents the benefits of different working groups operating on different channels.
Finally, while forcing a single nationwide communication system on all response
agencies is financially and logistically impractical, agencies in small or isolated
municipalities could implement this strategy on a smaller scale. In many cases, it is
logical for the fire department and the police department of the same town to agree on a
common system before overhauling their radio infrastructure. They could then have
seamless interoperability with each other in most day-to-day occurrences that require a
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joint response. However, if a larger event occurred that required the aid of state and
federal agencies or neighboring cities, the interoperability problem would return. Also, a
single system might not meet the operational needs of two different types of agencies,
because agencies can use radios in very different ways (Doherty Interview 2006). There
would need to be strong coordination and planning between the affected agencies,
especially in determining how to divide and manage the cost of the shared system.
Short-term Technical Solutions
The non-technical workarounds can be inexpensive and simple to implement, but
they do not provide the level of interoperability or reliability that many emergency
responses require (National Task Force on Interoperability 2005). Solutions involving
technology can offer more options, especially for those public safety agencies that need
seamless and transparent interoperability. There are currently three types of short-term
technical solutions and a number of vendors that provide devices in each type (National
Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center 2003).
The first technological solution is multiband radios. Multiband radios have two or
more receiver/transmitter assemblies in a single walkie-talkie. These allow responders to
tune into multiple frequencies at the same time, even if the frequencies are in different
frequency bands. This is especially helpful to overcome the problem of fragmented
spectrum. It is important to note, however, that these devices do not repeat signals from
one network to another, so only those responders with multiband radios will be
considered interoperable. The systems themselves are not linked, so responders with
single-band radios will still be unable to communicate outside their agency. These
devices also require that responders correctly program the radios to the frequencies of the
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other responding agencies. While a police officer with a multiband radio will most likely
preprogram the local fire department's frequencies, the introduction of a new agency -
FEMA, for example - will require additional work on the part of the responder. Finally,
because all of the interoperability components are integrated into the responder's
handheld walkie-talkies, it is difficult to make multiband radios fit the small weight and
size demands requirements by the users (Bischoff 2005).
Multiband radios are a good solution for linking individuals to multiple systems,
but they require buying new radios for most responders in at least one local agency. To
minimize the infrastructure upgrades and the changes to existing systems, response
agencies should consider the use of system-to-system gateways that rebroadcast the
transmissions of one system over another. These devices, also called crossband devices
because they usually rebroadcast into another frequency band, can range in complexity
from simple mobile repeaters to complex communication systems. The two major classes
of crossband devices are console patches and audio baseband switches.
Console patches are circuits that patch together two or more audio signals at a
communication or dispatch center. They provide the physical connections between two or
more audio devices, and can be used to patch radios to radios or radios to telephone
systems. Although older systems required operators to physically link the console patch
to the transmission hardware, current console patches rely on computers to establish
virtual links (NLECTC 2003). It is important to note that console patches generally
require hardware from all involved agencies to be physically installed at the same
communication or dispatch center, or linked by fiber optics. Console patches are
beneficial because they can link both audio and data or control signal transmissions.
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However, they require a significant amount of setup, and new agencies that come onto
the scene of an incident cannot be rapidly added to the architecture.
Audio baseband switches overcome those difficulties because they do not
physically connect the hardware of two communication systems like console patches do.
Instead, baseband switches rebroadcast audio signals from one communication system to
another. Generally, one radio from each agency is connected to the switch. These radios
are then used for receiving and rebroadcasting transmissions that come across the various
systems. This does require that each agency reserve one channel for interoperable
messages, but these channels do not have to be in any specific frequency band (NLECTC
2003). Additionally, audio switches can be deployed in either fixed or mobile locations.
In the event of a major incident, a truck containing the switch will be deployed along
with responders and the system can be almost immediately configured to link all the
responding agencies. These devices do suffer from the fact that they do not pass on any
control information, so messages passed through a trunked system, which dynamically
assigns channels, may not transmit correctly.
Long-Term Technical Solutions
Multi-band radios, console patches, and audio baseband switches provide
immediate partial solutions to the interoperability problem. However, each has drawbacks
which make them only suitable as stopgap measures. In order to truly eliminate a lack of
interoperability, future systems must be able to overcome the problems posed by
incompatible protocols, limited spectrum, and outdated technology. Two long term
technical solutions are attempting to do just that.
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The first long term technical solution to interoperability is the implementation of
standards-based shared systems (Boyd Interview 2006). These systems would be digital
trunk systems that employ standardized protocols to regulate who is talking on which
talking group. By conforming to well-defined public standards, equipment manufacturers
can ensure that their radios are compatible with radios developed by other firms. By
combining this technology with the next generation of multiband antennas, manufacturers
can also ensure that their antennas will operate in the biggest range of spectrum possible.
In this way, two public safety agencies with two different radio systems will be able to
immediately communicate, without patching their infrastructure together, rebroadcasting
their signals, or otherwise jury-rigging their technology. Standards are currently being
developed and finalized, and products with full standards support will be available by the
end of the decade (Orr Interview 2006).
The second long term technology is known as software defined radio (SDR).
Software defined radio is different from traditional radio, because the device's
functionality and signal processing is handled by embedded software. Theoretically, this
permits an SDR device with the right software to function as any radio device
imaginable, from an emergency responder radio to a cellular telephone to a garage door
opener (National Task Force on Interoperability 2005). It also permits the radio to receive
and transmit signals on any frequency or with any protocol, eliminating the two major
technical impediments to interoperability. Although several manufacturers are currently
offering some SDR products, the technology is still several years away from widespread
use in the emergency responder community (Boyd Interview 2006).
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Summary and a Look Ahead
Technology has an important role to play in establishing interoperability. There
are numerous non-technical and technical solutions that can provide varying levels of
interoperability for emergency responders. Table 2-1 contains a breakdown of the
solutions that were examined in this chapter and identifies the pros and cons of each.
While neither the solutions listed nor the dimension by which they are measured should
be considered an exhaustive list, this table gives a flavor of the types of choices that
public safety agencies must make when evaluating new technology.
lb ' 
Performance:
Swap radios * O $ O O b °_
Designated: cross-.
agency channel _ 0
Single shared system 0 
Multiband radios _ 
Console patch 0 
Audio basebandswitch _ 0 * * _ 0_
Standards-based
systems ' * ______
Software radio* Q
Table 2-1 Performance of various interoperability solutions
* = Limited current availability
While technology is critical for interoperability, policy set at all levels of
government is just as important. The next chapter will examine the policy decisions that
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Chapter 3- Federal Policy towards Interoperability
Interoperability is a problem that occurs at the state and local levels of
government. It is the state and local public safety agencies that suffer when their
emergency responders cannot communicate, and it is these same agencies that are
ultimately responsible for solving the problem. However, on September 11, 2001, the
nation realized that interoperability was too important a problem to be left to states and
localities alone. Emergency responders were suddenly faced with a new and imminent
threat of international terrorism, and many of them were ill-prepared to face the
technological and operational challenges that such a threat imposed (Rudman, Clarke,
and Metzl 2003). Given the likely possibility of future terrorist attacks and the probability
that these attacks would be high consequence events requiring the collaboration of
multiple agencies from multiple jurisdictions and disciplines, the lack of responder
interoperability suddenly became a national security issue. Thus, September 11 prompted
the federal government to make a number of organizational and policy changes to
improve the national level of interoperability.
Prior to September 11, there had been few federal non-military programs that
examined and promoted interoperability. The ones that did exist were limited in scope
and effectiveness. Federal advisory committees, like the Public Safety Wireless
Networking (PSWN) working group, had analyzed the problem and made
recommendations, but the onus was on the response community to adopt these
recommendations. The federal government had provided little in the way of incentives or
consequences for compliance with these recommendations, and they had few programs in
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place to assist emergency responders in purchasing new interoperability equipment.
Today, the federal interoperability landscape looks much different.
Chapter 1 highlighted five causes of noninteroperability: incompatible and aging
communications equipment, limited and fragmented funding, limited and fragmented
planning and coordination, limited and fragmented radio spectrum, and limited
equipment standards. The first three of these causes can be addressed by federal policies
that have immediate impact on the nation's level of interoperability. The last two,
spectrum and standards, will have a more long-term impact. This chapter will detail the
numerous federal efforts that have addressed or are addressing interoperability in the
post-9/11 world, both from the legislative and executive branches of government. It will
first look at how these efforts have been divided organizationally and will then focus on
programs and policies that are designed to mitigate the five causes of noninteroperability.
Organizational Makeup of Federal Interoperability Programs
Organizational charts rarely tell the whole story, but they can be useful places to
start to examine how an organization approaches a problem. In the federal government,
no single department or agency is wholly in charge of all federal interoperability
programs. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), created, in part, to provide
federal resources to state and local responders, is an obvious choice for a lead agency. In
fact, SAFECOM, a program within the DHS Office of Interoperability and Compatibility,
defines itself as "the umbrella program within the federal government to coordinate the
efforts of local, tribal, state and federal public safety agencies working to improve...
interoperable wireless communication" (Jenkins 2003). However, interoperability
programs also exist in the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Commerce
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(DOC), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and even other areas of DHS
(see Table 3-1 for a list of major programs). While SAFECOM coordinates with these
programs and agencies, it does not control their budgets or directly authorize their
activities. Thus, there is no single nexus point for all federal interoperability policies or
decisions.
Program Name Department Mission and Activities
SAFECOM DHS Oversees all initiatives and projects
pertaining to public safety
communications and interoperability
Office of Grants and Training DHS Provides funds to state and local
emergency response community for the
purchase of new equipment
Integrated Wireless Network DOJ Provide a consolidated nationwide
wireless communications service for
federal law enforcement and its agents
CommTech DOJ Assist state and local law enforcement by
developing, testing, and evaluating
interoperability solutions and products
Community Oriented Policing DOJ Provides grants to law enforcement for
Service (COPS) Interoperable researching or purchasing new
Communication Technology interoperable communications equipment
Program
NIST Public Safety DOC Develop standards for public safety
Communications Systems wireless communication
Wireless Telecommunications FCC Manage spectrum allocation for public
Board: Public Safety safety communication, including new
spectrum being appropriated for
interoperability
Table 3-1 Major Federal Programs that Impact Public Safety Interoperability
Sources: (Victory et al. 2005) and (Orr Interview 2006)
Although there are many programs now, there were even more in the first years
after September 11. Two additional programs - the aforementioned Public Safety
Wireless Network (PSWN), a joint effort between the DOJ and the Treasury Department,
and the Advanced Generation for the Interoperability for Law Enforcement (AGILE)
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program, which was under the DOJ - were shut down in 2003 and 2005 respectively 1.
These programs were thought to partially duplicate the efforts of other government
programs, especially SAFECOM12 (Chandler 2003), and were deemed superfluous. The
fact that they were shut down indicates that the federal government is working to
streamline the organizational components that address interoperability problems.
SAFECOM's own complex organizational history bears mentioning. The program
was originally conceived of several months prior to the 9/11 attacks as one of President
Bush's possible "e-government" initiatives. In October 2001, only a few weeks after
those attacks, SAFECOM was stood up in the Department of the Treasury. Management
problems and a lack of clear mission alignment with the Treasury prompted the
administration to move SAFECOM into FEMA13 in March 2002 (Koontz 2004). Under
FEMA leadership, SAFECOM went through two management teams before being
transferred to the DHS Science and Technology Directorate when the Department was
stood up in 2003. Although it still remains in the S&T Directorate, a new parent office
was created for it in 2004. This new Office of Interoperability and Compatibility was
designed to give the program more visibility within the public safety community, while
allowing it to retain its original mission objectives (Boyd Interview 2006).
Having more than a half dozen offices and programs working on the same general
problem requires significant coordination and oversight to prevent duplicative efforts.
Since 2003, when it was placed within the S&T Directorate, SAFECOM has adopted the
organizational responsibility to build partnerships and shared policies with those
11 Both the PSWN and AGILE were operating before September 11.
12 Documents produced under both AGILE and PSWN remain available in SAFECOM's online library
which can be found at: http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/library/
13 At this time, FEMA was still an independent agency. It would not become a part of DHS until DHS was
created in March 2003.
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interoperability-focused agencies that exist elsewhere in the federal government (Boyd
Interview 2006). This effort has not been undertaken easily. A 2004 GAO report found
that SAFECOM initially had trouble establishing agreements and Memorandums of
Understanding with its federal partners (Koontz 2004), but continued collaborations and
compromises have overcome most of those interagency roadblocks (Boyd Interview
2006). Although SAFECOM does not have direct control over the budgets and activities
of the law enforcement-focused components of DOJ or the spectrum-focused components
of the FCC, those agencies, as well as the other federal interoperability agencies, now
take direction from SAFECOM's interoperability policy initiatives.
Funding and Facilitating New Equipment Purchases
One of the key roles of the federal government is to help state and local
emergency response agencies purchase the right equipment as it becomes available. As
seen in Chapter 2, there are a number of technical solutions that provide varying levels of
interoperability that are either available now or will be available soon. While a majority
of the money for buying new equipment is generated at the state and local level - through
taxes, bond issues, and state grants - the federal government has an important role to
play, both in issuing money for interoperable communications and helping public safety
agencies make good choices about which technology they ultimately purchase.
Ever since September 11, the federal government has realized that first responder
interoperability is a national security problem, and not just a state and local problem. To
help foster interoperability, the federal government has reportedly issued over $2 billion
towards communication systems since 200114 (Office of Management and Budget 2006).
4 The $2 billion estimate is somewhat questionable and is given closer inspection in Chapter 4.
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Federal money to upgrade state and local communication systems is issued from both the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, usually in the form of
grants. Within DHS, the Office of Grants and Training is in charge of evaluating grant
requests and distributing funds. Within DOJ, the Community Oriented Policing Service
(COPS) fulfills that role. In both cases, SAFECOM is in charge of developing the grant
guidance and application criteria that ensures federal money is being used to foster
interoperability (Boyd Interview 2006).
Federal interoperability grants help states and localities patch existing networks
together, and they help fund the replacement of complete communication systems (Levy
2006). Regardless of size and use, all interoperability-focused grants require that the state
or local applicant address a number of issues in their proposal. First, they must describe
how the equipment they buy will improve technical interoperability with those agencies
around them. They must also define the governance structure and Memorandums of
Understanding that exist between their agency and the surrounding agencies. If the
applicant is a state entity that will then redistribute funds to localities, the state must
identify the local input they received in formulating the grant, to ensure that the people
who will actually be using the technology have had sufficient input into the process
(Project SAFECOM 2005b). These various requirements are designed to ensure that all
federal emergency responder communication grants are put towards their best use
possible, and contribute in some way to increasing interoperability (Boyd Interview
2006).
Besides individually distributed block grants, there have been several other
initiatives that the federal government has used to improve interoperability around the
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nation. One of the most important was RapidCom 9/30, a program that created a
minimum level of incident-level interoperability for ten urban at-risk areas 5 in 2004.
According to the DHS press release that was issued at the program's announcement,
RapidCom was designed to "ensure that incident commanders have the ability to
adequately communicate with each other and their respective commanders" within "an
incident area approximately the size of the attacks on the World Trade Center towers"
(Department of Homeland Security 2004). Recognizing that full and always-on
interoperability was still a long-term priority, RapidCom focused only on providing the
selected cities with a minimum level of interoperability, generally by funding the
purchase of console patches and crossband repeaters. It also provided assistance with
setup, training, and maintenance of this new communication equipment. RapidCom was
successfully completed in September 2004, with all of the targeted cities reporting a
significant increase in interoperability (Boyd 2005a). The RapidCom initiative also
resulted in a "lessons learned" document that helps public safety officials in other major
cities evaluate and implement their own interoperability plans.
Besides providing funding, the federal government also evaluates the technology
that is available and makes recommendations about what technology should be
purchased. The number of "interoperability solutions" from multiple vendors can be
enormous and overwhelming. Emergency responders are busy carrying out their day-to-
day missions and often do not have the resources or expertise to evaluate multiple
technologies (Boyd 2005b). Without federal guidance, first responders must either rely
on manufacturer assurances or previous buyer reports to evaluate which technology to
15 The urban areas were: New York, NY; Chicago, IL; Washington, DC and adjacent regions; Los Angeles,
CA; San Francisco, CA; Philadelphia, PA; Houston, TX; Jersey City, NJ; Miami, FL; and Boston, MA.
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buy. Unfortunately, these sources of information may lack the level of objectivity that is
needed by many public safety agencies. The federal government can serve as the
impartial data source that provides consistent and up-to-date evaluations of new
technology and services.
Evaluations are meaningless without a common baseline to compare different
systems. One of SAFECOM's first tasks was to establish formalized requirements that
manufacturers are expected to meet. The resulting document, the Public Safety Statement
of Requirements' 6 (SoR), is intended to "[help] the public safety community convey a
shared and vetted vision that ultimately will help industry better align research and
development efforts with critical interoperable needs" (Project SAFECOM 2006). This
document is a statement of functional needs, such as compatibility, usability and
ergonomic requirements. Because it shies away from technical requirements, it gives
manufacturers some liberty in how they fulfill the SoR. However, in many places, the
document is very far reaching with its demands; some of the specifications involve
handset biometric identification and real time foreign language translation, both
technologies which are still years from commercial deployment. Altogether, this
document provides a comprehensive, if somewhat long-term, expectation of the end user
experience.
In order to evaluate the SoR requirements, as well as compliance with
interoperability standards, NIST and SAFECOM have partnered to create a
comprehensive testing and evaluation program (Lipowicz 2005). This Conformity
Assessment Program, which is currently under development and scheduled for
16 The Public Safety Statement of Requirements vl. 1 can be found online at:
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/library/technology/1 253_statementof.htm
42
implementation by the end of 2006, will produce "a sort of 'Consumer Reports' of
[emergency responder communication] equipment" (Department of Homeland Security
2005). Once it is published, public safety agencies can then turn to that report and
determine what features and level of compliance a given device or system has. Since this
testing and evaluation program is still being developed, some details, such as how often
and under what conditions systems will be evaluated, is not yet publicly known.
Regardless of the final details, many public safety agencies are eagerly awaiting the
Conformity Assessment Program's deployment (Doherty Interview 2006).
Other programs within the federal government also provide testing and evaluation
of interoperable communication systems. Most notable is the National Institute of
Justice's CommTech program within the DOJ. This program has already conducted one
technical evaluation on a piece of interoperability equipment, the ACU-1000 console
patch. This test used a combination of Federal laboratory assessments and operational test
bed exercises for field evaluations (AGILE 2001). However, this evaluation occurred in
2001, and it is unclear what progress has been made on the other five systems currently
listed as being evaluated (CommTech 2006). It is also unclear what collaboration, if any,
the CommTech evaluation process will have with the SAFECOM/NIST Conformity
Assessment Program.
Encouraging Collaboration
Providing new technology is obviously an important part of creating
interoperability. However, according to many interoperability experts, the most important
thing that the government can do is encourage collaboration between agencies. Dr. David
Boyd, the director of SAFECOM, testified that "Technology is at the center of
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[interoperability]..., but [it requires] serious agreements, planning, [and] governance
kinds of arrangements across jurisdictions" (Stevens 2005). Dereck Orr, the Program
Manager for NIST's public safety communication program, said that the most important
thing the government can do is foster "Memorandums of Understanding, training and
joint exercises" (Orr Interview 2006). Captain Vin Doherty of the FDNY joked that the
best interoperability technology that DHS could develop is an "egonator pill" that would
eliminate the egos of the various federal, state, and local agency leaders and bring them
all to the same table (Doherty Interview 2006). In short, many experts agree that
interoperability is impossible without collaboration at the state and local level.
The federal government recognizes the importance of coordination on an
organizational scale as well. One of the first public documents ever produced by
SAFECOM was the Interoperability Continuum, seen in Figure 3-1. This chart lists five
different dimensions of interoperability: Governance, Standard Operating Procedures,
Technology, Training & Exercises, and Usage. Of these five dimensions, four deal with
how responders work together and assist each other to achieve interoperability. Only one,
Technology, deals with the devices that responders use to communicate.
44
-C"ccu rity Interoperability Continuum SAFECOl1
Individal Agencies nforna . .. KeyMulfidopine - 9 i a
· , rlting wilh a ,G.oveance i ' I Working Coordin ation Staff Collaboration t .
· ; , Independenty . Between Agencies on Regular asis e'
< E
Matioaal Incident Ei 
Usdard I hldividual M R anagement Set _Joint SPs for Joint SOPs for ReMinaleeto
OP-tkq ~~Agency yt JOigrating~ 3-1en~ Planrnd Events Emergencies Com uniationsPirobedures . tpoilSOPsSOPs Integrated SOPs 
shiaed, Preupretersfethngy agenaes e Raio h twn reuieens anaded ,.-'p.', eds, there Saard' : d
Legal~~~~~~~ statutes . .', :gremnt, agencylrivalries. ,.% .,~~~l~1 
,.' and personli colictsr can all E~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~L'
governmentmust trea lightly srit enurag~eordiaton soe thtnneohivleLocalized
Uage Planned Events EmergencyReinlncen ayue2
Incidents ~Management Throughout Region 
Minimal 4L. , ~L) 
parties~ ~~~~~~--~i.. fee Optimado wtdrwfrmth roesFigure 3-1 The Interoperability Continuum
Source: (Project SAFECOM 2005a)-
Collaboration is critical to interoperability, but fostering it is a much more
difficult problem than p roviding new technology. With 60,000 state and local public
safety agencies, each with their own requirements and interoperability needs, there are
almost a limitless number of relationships and governance structures that will exist
between them. There is no easy template for achieving collaboration between agencies.
Legal statutes, preexisting agreements, agency rivalries and personality conflicts can all
also negatively impac  the ability for a region to become interoperable. The federal
government must tread lightly as it encourages coordination, so that none of the involved
p arties feel marginalized or withdraw from the process.
T his l ast point is shown in the history of SAFECOM. In its first year of operation,
SAFECOM wa s "seen s a a top-down entity with a federal focus" and was unable to
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gamrner widespread support for its activities (Gurss 2006). First responders were put off by
its authoritarian style and did not believe that the federal government was in a good
position to assess their needs. When SAFECOM was moved to DHS in 2003, it
restructured itself to take a bottom-up approach. Instead of imposing recommendations
from on high, it began to base almost all of its decisions on emergency responder and
public safety community input (Boyd Interview 2006). As a result, the user base had
much more buy-in to the process and became much more responsive to federal policy
decisions.
In the last two years, Congress and the Department of Homeland Security have
taken additional steps to foster collaboration between public safety agencies. In the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Congress directed the
Secretary of Homeland Security to quickly develop two regional pilot programs that
would "develop a regional strategic plan to foster interagency communication... and
coordinate the gathering of all Federal, State, and local first responders in that area"
(Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 2004). These Regional
Communication Interoperability Pilots, implemented in Kentucky and Nevada, brought
members of the public safety community together in each state, so that they could come
up with collaborative solutions to interoperability. Although the pilot programs are still
ongoing, proponents report that they have been instrumental in "[helping SAFECOM]
identify models for improving communications and interoperability" as well as providing
a near-term increase in the interoperability of those two states (Boyd 2005b).
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Freeing Spectrum
As discussed in previous chapters, public safety agencies suffer from fragmented
and limited spectrum. In the United States, the FCC has licensed 10 different frequency
bands of the electromagnetic spectrum for emergency responder use, ranging from 25
MHz to 870 MHz17. The physical nature of radio waves and antenna design prevents a
single radio from being able to reach more than two or three of these different bands. For
efficiency and to prevent interference, response agency communication equipment is
usually designed to operate within only one or two of these bands. Thus, if two different
public safety agencies have communication systems that operate in two widely separated
bands, they will not be interoperable.
A lack of available spectrum also exacerbates the problem. Many of the technical
fixes described in Chapter 2 require the use of extra frequency for passing interagency
messages or control data. With public safety agencies confined to narrow chunks of
scarce spectrum, they are unable to implement some of these solutions (National Task
Force on Interoperability 2005). Although these spectrum issues are generally confined to
major cities, they still pose significant challenges for emergency responders. As the
director of SAFECOM phrased it, "[spectrum scarcity] only affects 15% of the country,
but it impacts 85% of the population" (Boyd Interview 2006).
Spectrum is a finite and valuable resource, one that has been highly regulated in
this country since the early days of radio. For many years now, all spectrum that is
This fragmented approach occurred partially by accident and partially by design. In the 1950s and 1960s,
as cities grew and more first responders began to use radio systems, the need for public safety spectrum
increased. The FCC allocated patches of available frequency as existing spectrum became overcrowded,
but often had to choose non-adjacent patches because all nearby frequencies in the spectrum had already
been allocated to other purposes (National Task Force on Interoperability 2005). Some patches of
frequency, however, were chosen for their physical properties. Low frequency transmissions are useful in
rural areas, because they travel farther without distortion. High frequency transmissions are useful for
transmitting large amounts of data, because the radio wave oscillates quickly.
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technically suitable for radiocommunication has been allocated for some purpose
(Manner 2003). In order to expand the amount of spectrum allocated to first responder
radio communications, the FCC must take spectrum away from someone else. This
presents both technical and political problems, because owners of spectrum have already
made significant investment in infrastructure that is designed to operate on those
frequencies. No one wants to lose spectrum that they have previously been granted.
In 1995, the FCC and the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration 8 (NTIA) began to examine how the spectrum needs of the public safety
community would change over the next 15 years. Together they established the Public
Safety Wireless Advisory Committee (PSWAC), a group made up of public safety
representatives, to determine how much additional spectrum responders would need by
2010. The PSWAC estimated that the public safety community would require an
additional 97.5 MHz of radio spectrum to keep up with current growth, an amount much
larger than the FCC had hoped (Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee 1996).
To date, only 24 MHz of additional spectrum has been identified by the FCC as a
good candidate for reallocation to public safety agencies. This spectrum, from 764-776
MHz and 794-806 MHz, was chosen for two reasons. First, it is close enough to the
already allocated 36 MHz of public safety spectrum in the 800 MHz range to facilitate
interoperability with devices on those frequencies. Second, it is spectrum that was
previously allocated to infrequently used broadcast television stations19.
18 The National Telecommunications and Information Administration is in charge of regulating spectrum
for federal agencies, as opposed to the FCC which regulates spectrum for state, local, and commercial
entities.
19 This spectrum in question comprises television channels 63, 64, 68, and 69 as well as some overlap into
adjacent channels.
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In 1997, Congress authorized the reassignment of this 24 MHz of spectrum in the
700 MHz band to public safety, on the belief that the television broadcast stations using
that spectrum would begin to switch over to digital broadcasting. However, the television
broadcasters have been slow to give up the use of their analog frequencies. In many
major metropolitan areas, this spectrum that was allocated for public safety use is still
being blocked by broadcast television channels, almost 10 years after the change was
made in legislation (National Task Force on Interoperability 2005).
Although broadcasters were essentially squatting on spectrum that was no longer
theirs, there was little that responders or the FCC could do. In the 1997 legislation,
Congress had said that broadcasters were not required to give up that spectrum until
December 31, 2006 or until 85% of the broadcast market had the equipment to receive
digital signals, whichever was later. Since digital equipment penetration has been low,
there was no certain date when the spectrum would be available. Radio manufacturers
and emergency responders were reluctant to invest in developing or purchasing
equipment that used this new spectrum, because there was no guarantee that it would ever
be viable (Boyd Interview 2006). However, following Hurricane Katrina, and lobbying
firom the responder community and government agencies such as SAFECOM, Congress
reevaluated its position on the spectrum issue. In legislation in early 2006, Congress
mandated that broadcasters must vacate the channels by February 17, 2009 (Deficit
Reduction Act 2005). It is expected that, once it is finally usable, this additionally
allocated spectrum will go a long way in eliminating interoperability problems for those
public safety agencies that are in large metropolises with overcrowded radio waves.
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Creation and Implementation of Standards
As discussed in previous chapters, a lack of open and non-proprietary standards is
one of the critical impediments to interoperability. If systems from one vendor transmit
signals that cannot be understood by a system from another vendor, then it is impossible
for agencies using those two systems to communicate. Dereck Orr testified that, "in the
absence of standards, achieving... interoperability would be impossible" (Orr 2005).
The emergency response community recognized the need for open standards years
ago. In 1989, a group of officials from the local, state, and federal public safety
associations and agencies met together to determine the best way to define standards that
would both ensure radios from different vendors would be interoperable and would create
a more competitive marketplace for communication systems (Project 25 Steering
Committee 2006). The result was Project 25 (P25), a set of standards that would be
developed by a steering committee of public safety officials with technical support from
the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA).
The TIA and the P25 Steering Committee conceived of P25 as a suite of standards
that would define eight of the interfaces necessary in a digital land mobile radio system.
These include mobile-mobile communication, mobile-base station communication,
console-console communication, and several others20 . These standards, once properly
defined, could be implemented by equipment manufacturers and the public safety
community would then be able to purchase "P25 Compliant" devices that would
communicate with other P25 devices, regardless of the manufacturer.
20 For a complete list and technical description of the eight interface standards specified by Project 25,
please see http://www.p25.com/resources/P25TrainingGuide.pdf
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Unfortunately, the progress of Project 25 was very slow. Until late 2005, over 15
years after Project 25 was first initiated, only one of the P25 interfaces had been
advanced to a level where it could provide an acceptable level of interoperability. This
interface, the Common Air Interface, defines the wireless access between multiple
handheld units or between handheld units and base stations. While this is a critical step
towards achieving interoperability, according to Mr. Orr, the Common Air Interface
alone is not enough. "The remainder of the interfaces either remains undefined or lacks
enough specificity to allow for a common implementation of the interface...resulting in
systems that do not meet the 'interoperability' requirements defined by the steering
committee" (Orr 2005). In other words, before 2005, manufacturers could produce
systems that conformed to the unfinished P25 standards but would still not be able to talk
to each other.
There are several contributing reasons for the slow development of these
standards, but the most important one resulted from a tussle between the various
stakeholders involved in the P25 development process. The public safety representatives
that made up the P25 Steering Committee were generally enthusiastic about getting all
eight interfaces formalized quickly, because of the positive impact it would have on
emergency operations. However, they had very specific performance requirements that
the standards needed to address. On the other end of the scale were the equipment
vendors and manufacturers, who were reluctant to change their already developed
protocols to fit new open standards. A shift to open standards would require that they
reengineer components of their entire product line, and it would also allow their
customers in the public safety community to purchase compatible devices from their
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competitors (Boyd Interview 2006). Proprietary standards lock consumers into buying
from specific manufacturers in order to ensure compatibility with existing infrastructure.
TIA, the organization contracted to develop the P25 standards, is primarily an
organization that represents the radio manufacturing industry and was understandably
caught in the middle. While it would be unfair to accuse manufacturers of trying to
intentionally stymie progress, inherent conflicts of interest made the process long and
difficult. As one commentator notes, "it is unrealistic to expect any business to
wholeheartedly embrace a process that effectively destroys a valuable marketing tool"
(Careless 2005). It was not until the federal government became involved that new
interfaces began to be developed.
In 2004, NIST, and specifically its Office of Law Enforcement Standards, began
to take a more involved role in the development of public safety communication
standards. NIST began consulting with the P25 Steering Committee and helped it identify
the three most important interfaces, besides the Common Air Interface, for enabling
interoperability2 1 . These interfaces were: the Inter-RF Subsystem Interface (ISSI), which
uses internet protocol to link communication systems from different jurisdictions; the
Fixed Station Interface, which defines how voice, data, and control messages are
transmitted from fixed stations to mobile units; and the Console Interface, which
describes how voice, data and control messages are transferred between mobile units and
a dispatcher or supervisor.
21 While all the interfaces in the P25 specifications contribute to interoperability in some way, some are
more critical than others. For example, the Data Network Interface would only contribute to
interoperability in limited situations when responders have the capability and need to access computer
networks from the scene of an emergency.
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NIST also offered the Steering Committee an interesting proposal. TIA had
agreed to develop the P25 standards in the early 1990s, but there was nothing in the
agreement that required the Steering Committee to adopt TIA's proposals. Through
Congressional direction, NIST offered to create a set of intermediate standards for the
Steering Committee, which would completely cut TIA out of the development process
and would limit its control over future standard definitions (Orr Interview 2006). In an
effort to retain control, TIA began to leverage its influence on industry to restart the
standards development process. Realizing that the federal government would plunge
ahead without its input, industry representatives agreed to increase their contribution to
the standards process. Thus, due to NIST's involvement, the standards development
process began to expeditiously move forward again.
As of May 2006, the ISSI is only weeks away from formalization and the other
two priority interfaces should be completed and formalized by mid-to-late 2006 (Orr
Interview 2006). Outside of NIST, federal support of the standards development process
is being felt from both the legislative and executive branches of government. Congress
has mandated P25 compliance on future radios being sold to the Department of Defense
(Careless 2005) and the President's FY 2007 budget calls for changes to the "lack of
shared technical standards... [that have] hampered the creation of regional
communication systems that are interoperable" (Office of Management and Budget
2006). While there is still significant work to be done in developing and implementing
P25 standards, the Steering Committee, the government, and industry are making positive
progress towards comprehensive standards, going farther in the last 12 months than
anyone has in the last 12 years.
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Summary and a Look Ahead
The federal government has instituted a number of programs and policies to
address interoperable communications, both in the near and long term. The intent of these
actions is clear. Grant programs, technical evaluations, and special programs and
initiatives will help public safety agencies purchase the equipment best suited to meet
their needs. In conjunction with fostering collaboration between state and local agencies,
these programs will help public safety agencies create at least limited interoperability in
the immediate future. Spectrum and standards reform will have long-term results,
because they will allow manufacturers to develop systems that are designed with
interoperable functionality already in place.
However, while the intent is good, the effectiveness and timeliness of these
programs is still in question. The next chapter will more carefully examine the policy
decisions that were detailed in this chapter, and identify some concerns with our nation's
ability to meet its interoperability goals.
54
References
AGILE. 2001. Operational Test Bed - Alexandria (OTB-A) Communications Interoperability Gateway
Subsystem Operational Test Document. Rome, NY: National Institute of Justice.
Boyd, David. 2005a. United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Testimony of David Boyd, Ph.D. September 29, 2005.
2005b. U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security - Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology. Testimony of Dr. David Boyd. October 26,
2005.
2006. Personal Interview. Telephone, March 27, 2006.
Careless, James. 2005. What on earth is taking so long? Mobile Radio Technology Magazine, December 1,
2005.
Chandler, Nikki. 2003. PSWN Preparing to Shut Down. Mobile Radio Technology Magazine, June 1, 2003.
CommTech. 2006. Operational Test Beds. National Institute of Justice, 2006 [cited April 3 2006].
Available from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/commtech/testing evaluation/.
Deficit Reduction Act. 2005. 109th Congress, Second Session, January 3, 2006.
Department of Homeland Security. 2004. RapidCom 9/30 and Interoperability Progress, July 22 2004
[cited February 20 2006]. Available from
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press release/press release 0470.xml.
2005. Building Confidence in P25: Assessment Program Will Help Ensure Compliance.
Interoperability Today, Summer 2005.
Doherty, Vin. 2006. Personal Interview. Washington D.C., March 29, 2006.
Gurss, Bob. 2006. Washington View - Promote Interoperability. APCO International, April 2006.
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. 2004. 108-458. 108th Congress, Second Session.
Jenkins, William O., Jr. 2003. Homeland Security: Challenges in Achieving Interoperable Communications
for First Responders. Washington DC: General Accounting Office.
Koontz, Linda D. 2004. Project SAFECOM: Key Cross-Agency Emergency Communications Effort
Requires Stronger Collaboration. Washington DC: General Accounting Office.
Levy, Leslie-Anne. 2006. Personal Interview. Washington DC, March 29, 2006.
Lipowicz, Alice. 2005. NIST, Safecom to validate first responder radios for interoperability. Government
Computer News, 9/23/2005.
Manner, Jennifer. 2003. Spectrum Wars: The Policy and Technology Debate. Norwood, MA: Artech
House.
National Task Force on Interoperability. 2005. Why Can't We Talk? Working Together to Bridge the
Communications Gap to Save Lives. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
Office of Management and Budget. 2006. The Budget for Fiscal Year 2007: Department of Homeland
Security, edited by Executive Office of the President.
Orr, Dereck. 2005. United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Testimony
of Mr. Dereck Orr. September 29, 2005.
.2006. Personal Interview. Washington DC, March 29, 2006.




Project SAFECOM. 2005a. Interoperability Continuum Brochure. Department of Homeland Security 2005
[cited February 3 2006]. Available from
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/librarv/interoperabilitvbasics/1 190 interoperabilityc
ontinuum.htm.
.2005b. Recommended Federal Grant Guidance: Public Safety Communications & Interoperability
Grants: Department of Homeland Security.
.2006. Frequently Asked Questions 2006 [cited March 29 2006]. Available from
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/about/faqci/.
55
Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee. 1996. Final Report of the Public Safety Wireless Advisory
Committee to the FCC and NTIA, September 11 1996 [cited April 10 2006]. Available from
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/pubsafe/PSWAC AL.pdf.
Rudman, Warren B., Richard A. Clarke, and Jamie F. Metzl. 2003. Emergency Responders: Drastically
Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
Stevens, Ted. 2005. United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation. Testimony
of U.S. Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK). September 29, 2005.
Victory, Nancy J., Michael Lewis, Jr. Thomas S. Dombrowsky, and Catherine M. Hilke. 2005. Homeland
Security and Communications: A Compendium of Federal Programs. Washington DC: Wiley Rein
& Fielding LLP.
56
Chapter 4- Federal Policy Analysis
The federal government has instituted a number of policies and programs to
address a lack of first responder interoperability. NIST has promoted communication
standards development, Congress and the FCC have pushed for increased emergency
responder spectrum, and SAFECOM, within the Department of Homeland Security, has
coordinated state and local government purchases of new equipment. Following
September 11, the federal government has clearly taken action towards solving
interoperability for emergency responders.
Despite these efforts, numerous critics have voiced concern that the federal
response is not enough. The National League of Cities recently called on DHS to make
"greater strides on interoperability," saying that the federal government was the only
entity capable of solving many of the causes of noninteroperability (Drake 2006). In May
200622, the DHS Inspector General will be issuing a report that says DHS's Science and
Technology directorate (S&T), which SAFECOM is a part of, is failing to live up to the
interoperability mandates set out for it in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Skinner
2006). Perhaps the most damning criticism comes from the 9/11 Public Discourse
Project, the public organization made up of the 9/11 Commission members. In their 2005
Report Card on 9/11 Commission recommendations, they gave the federal government a
grade of C in its treatment of first responder interoperability issues (Kean, Hamilton, and
et al. 2005). The Commission's Vice-Chairman, Congressman Lee Hamilton, recently
lambasted federal response saying that "[it] really approaches scandal to think that four
22 This report, A Review of DHS' Progress in Adopting and Enforcing Equipment Standards for First
Responders, has not been publicly released as of this writing. It is, however, summarized in the Inspector
General's Congressional testimony from March 8, 2006, and my summation is based on that testimony.
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years after 9/11, the police and the fire cannot talk to one another at the scene of the
disaster" (NBC News 2005).
The problem of interoperability is indeed complicated, and nobody who
understands it expects an overnight fix. However, knowledgeable thinkers have raised
legitimate concerns over the rate of progress in solving this problem. Thus, the two
questions posed at the beginning of this thesis arise again: has the federal government
made good policies towards emergency responder interoperability, and is the United
States sufficiently positioned to finally solve this problem in a reasonable amount of
time? These two questions will guide the analysis of the policies laid out in the previous
chapters.
The Interoperability Budget
In order to gauge federal commitment to solving any problem, one should first
look at how much money has been devoted to it. There are several estimates of the total
amount of federal money that has gone to interoperability since 2001, ranging from
around $1.5 billion to almost $3 billion. Because most of this money is in block grants,
and the government generally does not track and itemize the types of equipment that local
emergency responder grants are used for, an estimate is really the best one can hope for
(Levy 2006). Careful inspection of the federal budget, however, paints a more detailed
picture than the lump-sum value describes.
Interoperability has been a featured item in the homeland security budget since
there first was a homeland security budget. Even before Congress created the Department
of Homeland Security in 2003, the President's FY 2003 Protecting the Homeland budget
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provided a side-box detailing the interoperability problems faced on September 1123
(Office of Management and Budget 2002). The FY 2004 and FY 2006 budgets also
mentioned interoperability, with the FY 2006 budget detailing the interoperability grant
money that had been distributed through DHS during the previous year (Office of
Management and Budget 2005). The FY 2007 budget goes so far as to identify a lack of
"shared technical standards and coordinated operational plans" as one of the key
impediments to interoperability (Office of Management and Budget 2006).
Unfortunately, the President's submission to Congress is mostly explanatory and only
breaks down the budget by departmental and directorate levels. It is up to the various
Departments to determine how much money each program actually receives.
For the Department of Homeland Security, an organization that was only stood up
in FY 200324, the budget data is unfortunately sparse. The DHS FY 2007 Performance
Budget Overview25 and the Budget in Brief list programmatic expenditures for the Office
of Interoperability and Compatibility, with almost the entirety of this money going to
SAFECOM. As Figure 4-1 shows, there was a massive increase in spending in FY0526,
followed by significant increases of 24% and 13% for FY06 and the FY07 request. These
increases are much larger than the growth rate of the total DHS budget over that two year
period, which has held steady at 7%. Less inspiring, however, is the fact that the total
expenditure on interoperability programs in 2007 is only 0.08% of the total DHS budget
23 The President's budget is generally submitted to Congress in the February prior to the Fiscal Year of that
budget. The FY03 budget was submitted in early 2002, before the President was publicly supporting the
idea of creating a Department of Homeland Security.
24 The Fiscal Year starts October 1 of the preceding calendar year (i.e. FY 2006 started on October 1,
2005). The Department of Homeland Security was signed into law in November, 2002, stood up in March,
2003.
25 The Performance Budget Overview (PBO) is a high level summary of program performance goals,
performance measures, and budget information related to each program.
26 The comparatively low $1.5 million outlay for 2004 is possibly a partial year value, that only includes
money budgeted after the Office of Interoperability and Compatibility was created within DHS.
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of $35.6 billion (Office of Management and Budget 2006). There are also only 14 full
time DHS employees budgeted to work on interoperability programs in 2007
(Department of Homeland Security 2006).
Figure 4-1 Programmatic Funding for Interoperability and Compatibility (FY 2007 is requested)
Source: (Department of Homeland Security 2006)
The values in the above chart do not include grants that were distributed through
DHS for interoperable communication at the state and local level. Homeland Security
state and local interoperability grants come from the Office of Grants and Training
(OG&T) within the DHS Preparedness Directorate. This office awards billions of dollars
each year to state and local response agencies under a number of different grant titles.
Unfortunately for analysis purposes, many of the grants are large block grants that serve a
number of purposes, and OG&T does not categorize its grants by use. Therefore, there is
no clear breakdown of how much DHS has doled out in interoperability grant money over
the past few years. The director of SAFECOM estimates that, over the last three years,
roughly half of the $2 billion in communication upgrade grants cited by OMB went
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overall grants to state and local responders have been declining over that same time
period.
Grant information is more detailed for the Department of Justice and its COPS
Interoperability grant program. This program was started in 2003 to specifically provide
grants for interoperability at the state and local level, and has since provided grants to 63
jurisdictions. As Figure 4-2 shows, funding levels in this program have been steadily on
the rise. However, the amounts listed also show that only $386 million have been issued
by the Department of Justice. This means that, regardless of the estimate for the total that
one uses, the majority of federal interoperability grant money has come from DHS.
Figure 4-2 Grant funds for COPS Interoperability Grants
Source: (Department of Justice 2005)
With respect to COPS there are, surprisingly, no requested funds for FY 2007.
That is because, for the third budget in a row, DOJ has attempted to eliminate the COPS
Interoperability Grant program. DOJ argues that DHS should have sole authority over
interoperability grants, but in each of the past two years, Congress has continued to fund
the program at increasingly higher levels. This is largely because there is no dedicated
interoperability grant program within DHS. Both the Association for Public-Safety
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COPS Interoperability Grants
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Communications Officials (APCO) International and the Democratic Staff of the House
Committee on Homeland Security formally oppose the elimination of this program
(Association for Public-Safety Communications Officials International 2006).
These quick peeks into the federal budgets show that spending on interoperable
communications is growing at a much faster rate than other homeland security and first
responder spending. Given cost estimates of $15-20 billion needed to fix the problem
though and the lack of data on DHS grants, it is unclear if appropriations are increasing
fast enough. It is also unclear what impact DOJ's elimination of COPS will have, if it
actually goes through in the way that DOJ has proposed.
Organizing for Efficiency
The federal government has often been accused of duplicating efforts in its many
departments and agencies. September 11 brought to light a number of duplicative efforts
in the homeland and national security disciplines, from border control to disease
prevention to interoperability. One of the major goals of the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security in 2003 was to bring together the disparate and segmented
security-related programs under one agency banner. In terms of interoperability, it was
only partially successful with this.
Interoperability programs are still divided over four departments, with the
majority concentrated in the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Justice. SAFECOM coordinates these programs and tries to ensure that grants and
projects are not unnecessarily duplicated, but it, of course, has no legislative authority to
dictate the actions of DOJ or NIST programs. It also has no direct, sub-Cabinet way to
compel its federal partners to provide agreed upon funding, should they decide to
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withhold it. While SAFECOM's current leadership claims that the interagency
collaboration has been operating smoothly in the past year (Boyd Interview 2006), this
was not always the case. The programs early progress was impeded by both a lack of
interagency agreements and interagency funding (Koontz 2004). If all interagency
programs had been handled by the same federal department, SAFECOM would most
likely have been more effective in its early days.
However, having multiple federal programs deal with interoperability does have
some benefits. The fragmented approach allows individual offices to rely on core
competencies that exist within their parent organization. For example, the Public Safety
Communication Program (PSCP) at NIST benefits from the many NIST scientists and
engineers who are experts at developing standards. If the PSCP were to be moved into
some other department, such as DHS, its staff would be organizationally cut off from the
technical expertise they rely on (Orr Interview 2006). The same is most likely true for the
Department of Justice and the law enforcement expertise that it brings with it.
As stated in the budget discussion, DOJ is trying to eliminate the COPS
Interoperability Grant program in FY07. If Congress approves this elimination, which
they have blocked in the past two fiscal years, this would considerably reduce the size of
DOJ's interoperability portfolio. This action would help streamline the grant application
process for states and localities, as well as provide better oversight of interoperability
grant awards because all grants would be distributed through DHS. However, it is
essential that the money that would normally go to COPS gets transferred to DHS for
interoperability-specific purposes. Otherwise, the federal government will be exchanging
63
millions of dollars in aide for a slight increase in efficiency. It is not yet clear if the COPS
Interoperability Grant money will be deployed through DHS.
Purchasing Technology: Now vs. Later
The federal government has adopted a two-prong approach to addressing the
interoperability problem. It helps states and localities purchase the technical solutions that
are available now and provide limited interoperability, such as those discussed in Chapter
2. It also makes and implements policy decisions, such as developing standards and
freeing spectrum, which will open the way for better technical solutions in the future.
Unfortunately, the time factor involved presents federal, state and local decision makers
with a classic dilemma: how does one maximize the usefulness of purchases in the
present while not limiting their options in the future?
A hypothetical example may help illustrate the problem. Let us say that in 2007,
the city of Orlando applies for an Urban Area Security Initiative grant that requests
$200,000 for an additional six audio baseband switches. These devices allow messages
from the Orlando Police Department and the Orlando Fire Department to be
rebroadcasted on each others bands at the scene of an emergency. The city receives the
grant, purchases and installs the devices, and then has limited interoperability27 at the
scene of an incident.
In 2009, competition between radio manufacturers drives down the price of a
P25-compliant radio system to $2 million. Orlando applies for $1 million of new grant
money and raises the same amount in matching funds. But because they already received
$200,000 in interoperability funds just two years prior, they are cut from consideration
27 As discussed in Chapter 2, baseband switches limit responders to only transmitting interoperable
messages on a single channel, so they cannot use separate talking groups.
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for the grant. Orlando policymakers begin to regret their decision to submit the grant for
the additional baseband switches in the first place.
Almost all policymakers agree that interoperability is an immediate problem that
should be fixed as quickly and as completely as possible. The inherent tradeoff between
speed and completeness, though, should be cause for consideration by both federal grant
managers and state and local response agencies. The effective use of grants is only part of
the problem. In emerging technologies, there will always be some new technology just
over the horizon. A new type of radio system, and its impact on public safety, should not
be dismissed just because it is not fully developed and in place yet.
For those areas with no interoperability between response agencies, it is probably
wise to apply for federal money immediately; a minimum level of interoperability is
better than nothing. However, for areas simply wanting to expand the scope of their
interoperable communications or link a new system into the network (i.e. bringing
connections with the state police and the county sheriff online), it makes sense to at least
spend time analyzing how current policy and technology directives will impact the
interoperability landscape over the next 24 months. Purchasing immediately is not always
the wisest course of action.
Spectrum and Standards: Impetus for Change
Both the push for standards and the release of spectrum to public safety officials
have been delayed for years. P25 standards were first conceived of in 1989 and are only
now being developed to provide network-level interoperability. Additional spectrum was
authorized for public safety use in 1997, but Congress wrote the legislation in such a way
that the TV stations occupying that spectrum would be allowed to sit there until 2007 at
65
the earliest. Only in early 2006 did they set an absolute date for the release of the
spectrum. Even with the need for interoperability demonstrated by the Oklahoma City
bombings, the Columbine High School shootings, and September 11, government
officials failed to take action on these issues until 2005. Looking at the history, it is
logical to wonder what took so long.
In the case of standards development, the government was simply not identified
as a necessary player in the process until 2004. Before that, the P25 Steering Committee
had contracted with TIA, a recognized Standards Development Organization, and was
handling the process on its own. Although it was proceeding very slowly, the matter was
being handled as a private-sector problem, without government interference. In 2003 and
2004, newly formed or redesigned government interoperability programs collectively
identified a lack of standards as one of the major impediments to first responders. Based
on recommendations by these groups, Congress started to take action and proposed "the
issuance of intermediate standards," that would have taken the power away from private
sector stakeholders and the TIA (Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State
Appropriation Bill of 2005 2004). Before that, though, there was no push for any
government agency to inject itself into the standards process.
As for spectrum policy, there was no argument about whether or not the
government should be involved; no one else has the authority to allocate or regulate
spectrum. This problem was more of a problem of shortsightedness on the part of
Congress and the FCC. When Congress freed the 24 MHz of TV broadcast spectrum in
1997, they were operating under the assumptions that most TV stations would have
already released control of the spectrum in question as they switched to digital
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broadcasts. This conversion to digital is proceeding much slower than Congress
anticipated, so the television stations continued to retain control of their spectrum.
Why Congress did not pass new spectrum legislation before Hurricane Katrina hit
is still a mystery. The need for it was certainly there. In its 2004 report, the 9/11
Commission listed the release of spectrum as one of its chief recommendations (Kean,
Hamilton, and et al. 2004). Numerous agencies alerted Congressional panels to the
importance of spectrum. Bills that redefined the spectrum reallocation dates and
deadlines were introduced, but were stalled or weakened in committee (Kruger and
Moore 2005). The House started making serious efforts to pass spectrum reform in 2005,
but it was only after Hurricane Katrina re-raised the problem of interoperability in the
minds of the public that the Senate took up the issue. In early 2006, Congress finally
passed legislation setting a fixed date for the transfer of spectrum. Public safety agencies
in metropolitan areas can begin investing in equipment that uses that spectrum, confident,
that it will eventually be available for them (Boyd Interview 2006). However, the date of
February 17, 2009 is still so far in the future that it may make little difference for first
responders who need extra spectrum now.
Federalism and Interoperability
This thesis has so far focused on the federal government's role in creating
interoperability amongst state and local responders. However, the role of the states and
localities themselves must not be forgotten. While the federal government has some
obvious inherent advantages in its ability to set national policies and strategies for
interoperability, the actual solving of the problem still occurs at the local level. It is local
responders and officials who write the grant proposals for new equipment, raise the
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matching funds through bond issues, develop partnerships with responders from
neighboring jurisdictions, and determine how best to achieve interoperability in their
community. Federal help is often appreciated, but it can be just as often rebuffed if it
begins to intrude too much into the autonomy of the local agency. Thus, the problem of
interoperability raises a much larger question that is found in many issues within the
homeland security discipline: to what extent should the federal government involve itself
in local preparedness decisions?
State and local emergency response agencies are designed to operate
autonomously, without heavy federal intervention. The 1 Oth Amendment of the
Constitution says that those powers not expressly given to the federal government shall
be retained by the states or the people. Thus empowered, these state and local
governments set up response agencies that are uniquely suited to deal with the special
challenges posed by the surrounding community. Generally, both the federal and the local
governments agree that it is the localities that are best suited to determine and provide for
their own needs. As one commentator puts it, "The people closest to the problem are the
ones best equipped to find the best solution" (Carafano and Weitz 2006).
In terms of interoperability, however, there are a number of reasons why the
federal government should be involved in the solution. First, federal agencies have
enormous power to set and achieve broad goals, such as developing standards or
reforming spectrum allocation. No single public safety agency or coalition of public
safety agencies will ever be able to leverage as much power as the federal government in
these arenas. Second, it has the ability to coordinate efforts between multiple
stakeholders, and serve as a mediator when disputes arise. Building interoperability
68
requires that responders build consensus, and sometimes that requires the intervention of
a third-party authority. Third, the government has the time and the expertise to think
about broader issues of interoperability. In the majority of response agencies around the
country, the responders are busy planning for and conducting day-to-day emergency
operations. The federal government has the flexibility to sit back and evaluate equipment,
look at proposed solutions, develop and share strategies, and serve as a central repository
for interoperability knowledge. Fourth, interoperability is a problem that will require
billions of dollars to solve. Barring significant investment by the private sector, the
federal government is the only entity capable of relieving some of the economic pressure
on the largely underfunded states and localities.
Interoperability conforms, in some ways, to a notion of a collective action
problem. According to Manfur Olson, who first proposed this theory in the late 1960s,
individual actors in a group that shares a common goal will not always pursue that goal,
because doing so will result in the group gaining something with all the cost going to the
individuals. In fact, Olson argues, "unless the number of individuals in a group is quite
small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in
their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their
common or group interests" (Olson 1971). A higher authority, such as the federal
government, can be that "special device."
For example, all the response agencies in the state of Georgia might desire
interoperability. A single town might consider lobbying for all agencies in the state to
purchase new P25 compatible radio systems. But, the cost to that town to lobby for and
coordinate a statewide upgrade makes it hard for the town to justify the effort. Only the
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power of a broader authority can facilitate such action. While the Georgia state
government could be the authority in this example, extrapolating this out to address a
national problem of interoperability shows that federal involvement is most likely
necessary.
A National Goal of Interoperability
The federal government has done many things to increase interoperability, but it
has been unable to set a definable and measurable end goal. Without an end state in mind
and a deadline for achieving it, there is no way to know if interoperability has been
solved. As the Strategic IT Lead for the DHS Office of National Capital Region
Coordination put it, "the interoperability train has already left the station, but it won't
ever get to its destination" (Torres Interview 2006). There is no destination for that train
to arrive at.
One of the reasons for this lack of an end goal is a problem of definition. Chapter
1 discussed how difficult it is to define interoperability, and how different response
agencies at different levels of government expect different things from the term.
SAFECOM has created its Statement of Requirements, which might be seen as a
document that describes an end goal. But many of the listed requirements are broad and
reach far beyond the basic interoperability notion of "responders being able to talk to
each other." These requirements also try to combine the needs of every response agency
imaginable, creating a set of functions that manufacturers would be hard pressed to
provide.
But even if the Statement of Requirements is viewed as a reasonable end-state for
interoperable technology, it does not lay out a timeframe for achieving interoperability or
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specify what the nation can consider to be a success. There is no short, simply phrased,
measurable interoperability goal. SAFECOM may eventually develop one, but as a small
office in the federal government, it probably lacks the accountability to set a national
imperative such as this. This problem deserves a goal to be set at the Cabinet or
Presidential level, so that no one can question the national commitment to solving it.
Summary and a Look Ahead
In recent years, the federal government has been criticized for being sluggish and
ineffective when dealing with interoperability problems. Some of these concerns are
legitimate, but the landscape is changing. While both the legislative and executive
branches were slow in responding to the need for standards and spectrum, they have
recently made a large impact in these areas. Interoperability money has been increasing
every year, and it has been doing so at a much faster rate than total homeland security
expenditures. The end-state is still a mystery, and significant questions remain about how
to best use money to achieve interoperability progress. But, despite this, incremental
progress is being made.
The federal government is not the only national entity that has faced or is facing a
lack of interoperable communications. Both the European Union and the United States
military, among others, have dealt with similar interoperability issues. The next chapter
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Chapter 5- Interoperability within the European Union
and the United States Military
The federal, state, and local emergency response agencies within the United
States are not the only entities that deal with a lack of interoperability. Radio use is
widespread among response agencies and militaries around the world, and most of these
organizations have faced interoperability challenges of their own at one time. While the
United States is still in the early stages of improving interoperability, other nations have
progressed much further. Both the story of the European Union and the United States
military serve as particularly interesting points of comparison to the United States'
approach to solving the problem.
Interoperable Emergency Response in the EU
The European Union (EU) is an intergovernmental and supernational political
body composed of 25 countries on the European continent. Member-nations share a
common currency, a common fiscal and agriculture policy, and a common approach to a
number of domestic and international issues. Because of the need for international
support and response in a number of emergencies, the member-nations of the European
Union have also taken a largely combined approach to ensure interoperability within their
emergency response communities.
Interoperability first arose as a prominent issue for European responders in the
late 1990s, around the same time that it did in the United States. While the tragedies of
September 11, Oklahoma City and Columbine were geographically removed from the
continent, Europe suffered its own share of disasters with responses that could have
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benefited from interoperability28. Like the United States, European communities wanted
to establish interoperability between agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and adjacent
jurisdictions. Also like the U.S., European efforts were stymied by a lack of spectrum,
standards, and funding. However, the European Union faced additional cross-national
issues that the United States, as a single country, had never needed to deal with. European
nations had historically had the autonomy and authority to establish their own frequencies
and communication policies. Before the late 1980s, there were no regulatory bodies, like
the FCC or NIST, which could create Europe-wide policies and standards for
communication equipment (Worrall 2005). Thus, achieving interoperability between
responders from different countries involved a shuffling of historically national
regulatory systems, and would seem to be much harder than achieving interoperability
between responders from different American states, regions, and levels of government.
Despite the additional roadblocks posed by international coordination within the
EU, scholars believe that "Europe quickly overtook the United States in the march
towards interoperability" (Mayer-Sch6nberger 2002). Europe has established a plan
towards interoperability that is based on three things: a quick adoption of standards, the
use of a standards-dependent frequency framework, and innovative methods to encourage
private investment in public infrastructure. While there is no guarantee that
implementation of this plan will result in the EU achieving better interoperability more
28 A principle example of an interoperability-related disaster was the February 1999 evacuation of the town
of Galtuer, Austria. Three avalanches had slammed down on the winter ski village, killing 31, cutting
power to the town, and blocking the only way out for the roughly 17,500 tourists and residents. Multiple
agencies brought rescue helicopters in to evacuate the population, but these helicopters were unable to
communicate. Alpine gendarmes had to distribute their old radio systems to the helicopter pilots, and, over
a series of days, these single-channel systems were the only resource available to coordinate a massive
rescue effort (Mayer-Schbnberger 2002).
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quickly than the U.S., their approach has given them what appears to be a significant
advantage adopting interoperable policies (Mayer-Sch6nberger 2005).
The first part of the European Union's interoperability strategy was the
development of standards for communication. Like the development of radio standards in
the United States, development in Europe started in the late 1980s29 . The newly created
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) was charged with creating a set
of radio standards that would be usable by a number of sectors including public safety,
transportation, public utilities, and industry. The result, TETRA, was a set of open, non-
proprietary standards for digital trunked radio communications that purportedly allowed
interoperability between all radio users, not just the public safety community (TETRA
MoU Association 2006a). Like Project 25, TETRA defined eight interfaces for air,
console, and network communications30. However, all eight of TETRA's interfaces were
finalized in the mid-1990s with first generation devices and networks deployed in 1997
(TETRA MoU Association 2006b). As discussed in Chapter 3, the United States' Project
25 is still in development and will only have three of its eight interfaces defined by 2007.
TETRA has now become the dominant radio communication standard in Europe,
with almost 90 manufacturers building systems that incorporate the open interfaces.
TETRA is also starting to see limited use in South America, Africa, the Middle East, and
China (TETRA MoU Association 2006a). Some manufacturers have considered
marketing it in the United States, but intellectual property restrictions have kept it from
being allowed in North America (Mohney 2005). Still, with over 4 million users expected
29 European communication standards were first being developed as the European Union, itself, was being
formalized as a political body.
3c The eight P25 interfaces and the eight TETRA interfaces are named and defined differently. However,
several interfaces from each set have functionally equivalent interfaces in the other.
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in the next three years and inroads being made into expanding worldwide markets,
TETRA is viewed as a wildly successful set of standards (Mohney 2005).
There are several reasons why TETRA's development and adoption may have
occurred faster than that of P25 in the United States. First, it had widespread EU support
early in its development. Mayer-Sch6nberger suggests that EU officials were willing to
get involved in the standards process at an earlier stage than the US government, because
Europe had already seen the success of a government-selected standard for cellular phone
networks31 . Thus, the idea of promoting radiocommunications standards was not foreign
to European policy makers (Mayer-Sch6nberger 2005). Second, TETRA was designed to
be usable in a number of sectors, not just public safety. With more private investors and
commercial stakeholders interested in its successful completion, there was more pressure
to get it completed and finalized. Finally, TETRA was closely linked with a spectrum
reallocation plan for emergency responders. The European Radiocommunications
Committee3 2 (ERC) mandated that users would need to switch over to TETRA-based
systems if they wanted to use the increased spectrum (ERC Decision of 7 March 1996 on
the harmonisedfrequency band 1996).
The second component of the EU's approach to interoperability was a spectrum
reallocation that was tightly coupled with standards. TETRA standards were designed
and optimized for additional spectrum that would be released to mobile radio users. In
1996, the ERC designated 10 MHz of spectrum as TETRA-only, and they rolled out an
31 The European Union passed legislation mandating that all European countries must use cell phone
networks based on the GSM standard. The United States opted for market-defined standards and now plays
host to two competing cell phone networks: GSM and cdmaOne.
32 The European Radiocommunications Committee, formed in 1991, was the radio regulatory body of the
European Union. The ERC performed duties that are filled by both NIST and the FCC in the United States.
In 2001, the ERC was merged with the European Committee for Telecommunications Regulatory Affairs to
form the Electronic Communication Committee. For more information, see http://www.ero.dk/.
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additional 10 MHz before the year 2000 (Mayer-Schbnberger 2002). Unlike the FCC in
the United States, directives from the ERC are non-binding and require ratification by
each nation. However, by 2001, twenty-six European countries had abided by the ERC
decision and released the TETRA-only frequencies for emergency responders and
others33 (Mayer-Sch6nberger 2002).
The third part of the European approach to interoperability, funding, was also
strongly integrated with TETRA. Digital-trunked radio systems like TETRA require
significant infrastructure investment, especially when they replace aging and
incompatible analog systems (National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology
Center 2003). In order to fund this infrastructure, many nations opted for a public
safety/public service cost sharing program that prioritized emergency responder
transmissions over the transmissions of other public service agencies (i.e. local
government, sanitation, etc.). In the UK, the government opened competitive bidding for
a private company to build and maintain the communications infrastructure. British
Telecom won the bid, and capitalized on a unique market opportunity by charging public
safety and service agencies to use its TETRA network (Mayer-Sch6nberger 2005). In this
way, the cost of the infrastructure replacement was absorbed by the commercial entity as
investment on a future business opportunity. In such a scheme, public safety agencies are
still responsible for purchasing their radios. However, the open, non-proprietary
standards of TETRA allowed the roughly 90 manufacturers in the sector to be in
competition with each other, which drove down unit prices (Mohney 2005). National
subsidies also helped defray the cost to response agencies (Mayer-Schbnberger 2005).
33 France and the Czech Republic opted against the use of TETRA and instead developed a completely
independent and incompatible system called TETRAPOL.
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TETRA-based systems are widely used around the world and have a number of
inherent benefits. However, critics are quick to point out that TETRA is not the end-all
solution for first responder interoperability. First, the fact that it is not targeted directly at
first responders, like P25 is, means that some features first responders require may not
have been adequately addressed. For example, responders are generally uncomfortable
with sharing a network, because of the risk that it might become overloaded by civilian
traffic during an emergency (Doherty Interview 2006). Don Pfhol, director of the Project
25 Steering Committee, also points out that TETRA radio signals do not transmit as well
as P25-based signals do over long distances. Because of this, most TETRA networks
would require too many towers to be economical in rural areas. By Pfhol's estimate, "in
ninety percent of the United States... you don't have the population density to justify
anything but Project 25" (Mohney 2005).
Because European and American interoperability policies were developed during
roughly the same timeframe, most of the lessons from Europe do not transfer easily to the
United States. The U.S. is already starting to engage standards and spectrum issues in a
more heavy-handed way that is reminiscent of the EU's approach. One area that the
United States would benefit from exploring is the potential for public-private partnerships
in the funding of emergency network infrastructure. Once P25 standards are well-defined,
the leasing of privately owned networks could provide new avenues for interoperability
that do not rely exclusively on tax dollars.
Interservice Interoperability in the U.S. Military
In 1983, the United States invaded the island nation of Grenada in order to quell a
communist uprising. During that military operation, multiple press reports detailed the
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inability of officers from one branch of the service to communicate with members of the
other services. In one striking example, "it was reported that one member of the invasion
force placed a long distance, commercial telephone call to Fort Bragg, N.C., to obtain C-
130 gunship support for his unit which was under fire" (Anno and Einspahr 1988). These
reports prompted the Department of Defense to seriously examine the state of their
Command, Control, and Communications Interoperability (C3I)34 between the services.
One might assume that the Department of Defense would have a much easier time
achieving interoperability than the public safety community. The Department of Defense
is much more hierarchical than the autonomous fire and police departments and other
first responder agencies across the nation. The Department also has significant control
over its allotted spectrum and significant financial resources to procure new technology.
While interservice rivalries do exist, very few military officers doubt that interoperability
would help them conduct their missions. Despite these obvious advantages, however, a
lack of interoperability is a problem that plagued almost every major military operation in
the 1990s, from Desert Storm to Kosovo (Faughn 2002). Even now, when officers can
communicate outside their services in most situations, there are still examples of
interoperability shortcomings in current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Pickup
2005). The state of military interoperability is much better than it was in 1983, but there
is still work to do to ensure full compliance.
In confronting interoperability issues, the military faced many of the same
challenges that the public sector now faces. In World War II, the military was
34 Interoperability in the military is generally defined much more broadly than interoperability for public
safety agencies. While first responders are mostly concerned with being able to talk to each other, military
systems must transmit location and tactical data, video, and other telemetry that extends beyond first
responder needs. This discussion will try to stay focused on the ability to talk between services via radios.
Also, C3I is now frequently referred to as C4I because of the addition of Computers.
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surprisingly interoperable because all the communication systems in use were purchased
around the same time and from the same vendor (Faughn 2002). However, in the 50 year
military buildup following that war, new communication systems replaced the old ones
without taking interservice communication into account. According to a 1999 report by
the National Research Council,
"The military services have tended to retain legacy information systems that were
developed in response to "stand-alone" requirements, were not regarded as subject
to connection with other systems and, therefore, are not operationally friendly
with their increasingly interdependent companion systems. The legacy systems
issue is one of the greatest challenges faced by the DOD today" (Committee to
Review DOD C4I Plans and Programs 1999).
The military also suffered standardization issues similar to those faced by public safety
agencies. As the military shifted its buying patterns towards commercial off-the-shelf
technology for communications, it acquired many of the same proprietary protocol
conflicts that prevent first responders from talking (Faughn 2002). Finally, although the
defense budget is orders of magnitudes larger than public safety budgets, it is not
unlimited. There are still problems funding new communication equipment, especially
when it is prioritized against the various other weapon and warfighting needs of the
military (Committee to Review DOD C4I Plans and Programs 1999).
Some of the military's interoperability problems were also decidedly unique. For
example, at the end of the Cold War, some weapon systems that were intended to fight
the nuclear threat were given conventional military roles3 5. Communication systems in
these platforms were never intended to be interoperable with ground troops (Faughn
2002), so in order to make them effective in conventional operations, these
communication systems had to be upgraded or replaced. In recent years, the U.S. military
35 The B 1 Bomber is a good example of a Cold War weapons platform that was given a new role as a
tactical bomber.
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has also conducted numerous operations as part of a larger coalition. Creating trans-
national interoperability between coalition units is especially challenging, because the
entire technical frameworks of the systems are often different (Illingworth 2002).
The military's approach to achieving interservice interoperability is a combination
of procurement policies, organizational changes, and directives from on-high. As early as
1967, the DoD issued an interoperability directive saying that military departments
should develop and procure compatible C3 equipment as a matter of policy3 6. According
to the GAO, however, "the [directive] was not adequately implemented,... nor was it
revised in a timely manner to provide necessary authority" (Conahan 1987).
Disagreements between the services prevented amendments to the directive until 1985,
when the Senate Armed Services Committee threatened to withhold all funds for
communication equipment unless the policy was updated (Conahan 1987). Since then,
the policy has been updated on a fairly regular basis, as new interoperability requirements
arise3 7. According to some, however, services still occasionally procure non-compliant
and non-interoperable communication equipment (Faughn 2002).
The Department of Defense also instituted numerous organizational changes that
helped promote interoperability. One of the most critical changes was the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986. This law prompted an almost complete overhaul of the DoD,
centralizing power with the Secretary of Defense and positioning the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisor to the President. The Act also
moved much of the power away from the service chiefs (i.e. the Army or Navy Chief of
Staff), which made it much easier to promote interservice collaboration and
36 DoD Directive 4630.5, originally issued on January 28, 1967.
37 The latest version of the Directive, dated May 5, 2004, can be found at
http://www.dtic.mnil/whs/directives/corres/pdf2/d46305p.pdf
81
interoperability (Illingworth 2002). Although it was not specifically directed at
communication interoperability, Goldwater-Nichols changed the way that services
worked together and was a critical step in making interoperability a logical requirement
for the officer corps.
Over the past 25 years, there have been numerous programs aimed at creating
interoperability. The Joint Interoperability for Tactical Command and Control Systems
(JINTACCS) program defined message standards and interfaces for C3I during the early
1980s. The TRI-TAC program developed fieldable telephone switches and radios for
deployment, and looked at broader issues of interservice communication. The Joint
Tactical C3 Agency provided oversight and management of interoperability operations
throughout DoD (Conahan 1987). In the 1990s, the limited success of the programmatic
approach prompted the Department of Defense to adopt an "interoperability triad." This
triad consisted of an operational architecture, a systems architecture, and a technical
architecture that were developed in concert and were meant to define overarching
strategies for interoperability (Committee to Review DOD C4I Plans and Programs
1999). As technology changed, oversight programs were put in place to make sure that
newly acquired technology met interoperability plans and guidelines (Faughn 2002). In
short, no one program, plan or strategy got the military to its current state of interservice
interoperability. It required a number of programmatic changes, strategic directives, and
organizational overhauls to apply a fix to the problem, imperfect though that fix may be.
If the U.S. military story is a good approximation of the emergency responder
story, then there is a long road ahead before this nation's public safety agencies can truly
achieve interoperability. Grenada was the military's September 11 - an event where the
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lack of interoperability was brought to light in a very public way. Yet, more than twenty
years after Grenada, interoperability between the services is still not perfect. To even get
to their current level of interoperability, the military had to try a number of approaches
and strategies, and institute a new organizational framework for the entire Department of
Defense. The thousands of emergency response agencies in this country lack the
centralized command structure, massive budget, and other advantages that DoD has when
dealing with interoperability issues. It may be foolhardy to expect that they can achieve
interoperability any faster than the military.
Summary
The European Union and the United States military both present intriguing
comparisons to the interoperability activities of the U.S. federal government. All three
organizational entities have faced or are facing similar technical challenges, yet each is
approaching them differently. The U.S. military is by far the farthest along in achieving
full interoperability, but it started working towards it more than 15 years earlier than the
EU or the U.S. public safety community. Despite its hierarchical command and control
structure, it had to try numerous policies programs to make headway. The European
Union, on the other hand, is moving the quickest towards interoperability, by building
their entire policy around a single set of standards - TETRA. All though this approach so
far seems successful, putting all its resources towards one technology may limit the EU's
options in the future. The United States federal government is taking a middle of the road
approach, with a few decentralized programs that are coordinated through a single office.
However, it remains to be seen if the United States public safety community can ever
achieve more than incremental progress towards interoperability.
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Chapter 6 - Charting a Path Forward
The introduction to this thesis contained two key questions. First, has the federal
government implemented good policies towards achieving interoperability between first
responders? The answer, as detailed in the previous chapters, is a qualified yes. Though
slow to start, the federal government has made progress in developing standards, freeing
spectrum, and funding the purchase of new equipment. They are beginning to evaluate
equipment and implement stop-gap solutions in risk-prone cities. Funding levels have not
yet reached what most would consider an adequate level, but federal funding is on the
rise. While more money or man-hours would be useful to solving the problem, the federal
government is satisfactorily fulfilling its role of supporting state and local response
agencies. Incremental progress is being made towards interoperability.
The second question - is the United States sufficiently positioned to solve
interoperability in a reasonable amount of time - is, of course, hard to answer. First, no
one really knows what "solving interoperability" looks like. It is easy to suggest that
buying new standards-based radio systems that operate in the right spectrum range will
solve interoperability. Yet even with all the technical advantages and money in the world,
public safety agencies will not be interoperable without a governance structure, joint
exercises, and adequate training and support. If public safety agencies plan and train
together, they might only have interoperability during the trained for emergencies and not
during the unanticipated encounters. Interoperability may never be something that can be
solved - it can just get successively better.
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In this second question, a "reasonable amount of time" is also an unknown
quantity. Some experts estimate that it will take another 15 years before the U.S. achieves
a pervasive level of interoperability. If the military example is any indication, such
estimates might very well be accurate. When asking about a timeframe, what
policymakers really want to know is, "Will a lack of interoperability ever again impede
the response to a major disaster?" Unfortunately, the answer is probably yes. No matter
how good the nation's cross-agency communications get in the next few years, there will
still be places that both lack interoperability and are vulnerable to disaster. If future
terrorist attacks, natural disaster, or large-scale criminal events occur in these places, they
will most likely suffer from an inadequate response that is caused, in part, by a lack of
interoperability.
The irony of this is that disasters that are worsened by a lack of interoperability
are the best catalysts for ensuring that interoperability continues to improve. September
11 prompted the creation of SAFECOM and the reorganization of interoperability efforts
within the federal government. Hurricane Katrina prompted Congress to set a hard date
for the release of spectrum to first responders. The regular occurrence of such disasters
keeps the funding for interoperability programs increasing. Conversely, if the next
disaster occurs in a place where partial interoperability has been achieved, there is the
possibility that funding for interoperability programs will be cut, because the problem is
already shown to be "solved."
The federal government has made a good start at creating incremental
improvements towards interoperability. There are still, however, many more actions that
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they can and should take. The following recommendations are designed to provide a path
forward for federal involvement in interoperability.
Recommendation 1: Encourage better collaboration between
local agencies by hosting roundtable discussions
SAFECOM should host roundtable discussions in those communities that lack
memorandums of understanding or governance agreements. The purpose of these
discussions will be establishing a timeframe in which to develop those agreements.
Collaboration is one of the most important, yet most frequently ignored, needs
when discussing interoperability. If responders have not met each other, trained together,
and hammered out command and control issues before a disaster, the fact that they can
talk to each other during a disaster will be meaningless. Collaboration can also help
response agencies coordinate purchasing plans and make the purchasing decisions that
best fulfill the combined goals.
The first step in any collaborative effort is a meeting where goals, objectives, and
timeframes can be discussed. SAFECOM should establish these initial meetings in
communities where interoperability has not yet been addressed at a procedural or
organizational level. In order to conduct and facilitate these meetings, SAFECOM should
hire between two and four "evangelists" who will arrange these discussions. These so-
called evangelists will facilitate the meeting, help convince the stakeholders of the need
for interoperability, and guide the participants towards establishing a timeline for the
development of governance agreements. Evangelists will also help participants
understand the federal role in building interoperability.
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Recommendation 2: Encourage better industry participation
through endorsements and public/private partnerships
The Department of Homeland Security should push for the creation of an
independent review panel for new public safety communication systems. This panel
should give endorsements to those communication systems that perform well, promote
interoperability, and have compelling feature sets. These endorsements should be
communicated to the public safety consumers who are looking at buying these systems.
SAFECOM should also establish a pilot program that promotes the use of a privately
owned, publicly used communication network.
The private sector has been poorly engaged in the efforts to achieve
interoperability. The federal government has been reluctant to intrude in to the workings
of the market, and the market has been slow in responding to responder demands for open
standards. Now that open standards are becoming a reality, the federal government must
encourage the private sector to be more closely aligned with the goals of its public safety
agency consumers.
The first step is to ensure that the private sector is producing products that meet
emergency responder needs. SAFECOM and NIST, in a positive first step, are
establishing a program that will evaluate new products to ensure that they are Project 25
compatible. However, emergency responders face a number of choices when choosing a
communication systems vendor. Even if something is P25 compatible, it may not have
good coverage, easy of use, or otherwise fulfill responder needs. To help public safety
agencies make the best choice regarding their purchases, the Department of Homeland
Security should push for the creation of an independent review panel. This review panel
should evaluate new systems on a number of different metrics and include an
endorsement system that gives a "Seal of Approval" or "Editor's Choice"-type award to
deserving products. This endorsement would be highly sought after by manufacturers,
because it would instantly highlight their products for their consumers. Qualification for
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this endorsement would be based primarily on the ability of the system to be
interoperable, but it would also include ease of use, price, and the system's feature set.
Grant proposals that include the purchase of endorsed systems might also be given
greater consideration in the competitive process, although this could produce the
unintended consequence of localities proposing purchases that do not fit their needs, just
to win the grant.
Besides promoting an endorsement system that is aimed at encouraging
manufacturers to produce better products, the Department of Homeland Security should
institute a pilot program that encourages public/private partnerships on investments in
communication networks. As Chapter 5 discussed, Great Britain created an excellent
private-sector opportunity when British Telecom invested in new communication
infrastructure and then charged responders a monthly fee to use it. Such a program could
easily be repeated in the United States, although it would have to be in a region of the
country that is both looking to upgrade its communication systems and has enough
responder density to justify the cost model. The federal government will participate by
bringing the stakeholders to the table and, if necessary, providing a buyout option for the
private firm, should the pilot program fail.
These are just two examples of ways in which public and private interests can
align through federal action. By encouraging further private sector involvement in
interoperability through other novel solutions, the government can help increase the
speed at which interoperability becomes pervasive in our nation.
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Recommendation 3: Create an interoperability grant program
within DHS
The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Grants and Training should
establish a new grant program that provides money to exclusively increase interoperable
communications. Under this new structure, states and localities would no longer be
allowed to apply for interoperability equipment through block grants or DOJ
interoperability grants. Instead they would apply directly to this new program.
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, there is no grant program within DHS that is
specifically designed to provide money for interoperable communications. Instead, state
and local agencies can apply to a number of different general or block grants and include
interoperability as a component of those applications. The Department of Justice has the
COPS Interoperability Grant program, which does provide money exclusively for
interoperability, but OMB has repeatedly tried to eliminate that program. If they are
successful, there will be no specifically institutionalized support of interoperability within
the federal government.
Creating an interoperability grant program as the exclusive source of federal
interoperability funds will serve a number of purposes. First, it will ensure that funds that
could go to this problem are not lost to serve other, less important, homeland security
initiatives. There are numerous stories - some probably apocryphal, but still relevant - of
small towns using homeland security grants to purchase unnecessary video cameras,
SUVs, and air conditioned garbage trucks. While the localities are in the best position to
determine their own needs, and most homeland security money does go to fix real first
responder problems, interoperability deserves special attention as a problem that affects
almost all public safety agencies. Removing interoperability funding from general
homeland security grants will ensure that the localities with real interoperability needs
will not be in competition with those whose needs may be less immediate.
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A separate interoperability grant within DHS would also placate critics who are
upset that the COPS Interoperability Grant program is being phased out. Critics are
worried that the phase-out will reduce the visibility of interoperability as a national
problem. They are also worried that once the program is eliminated, the money that
would go into it will be reabsorbed by the Justice Department and not appropriately
distributed to first responders. The new interoperability grant would condense the
majority of interoperability programs within DHS, keep interoperability at a high level of
collective consciousness, and provide transparency for the budget walkover between DOJ
and DHS.
Finally, this grant program will provide much more data about the amount of
federal money that is going to fix interoperability. Financial estimations are not sufficient
when dealing with a problem of this importance. While a careful review by auditors
would be able to calculate the exact amount of federal money that is going towards
interoperability, a budget line item would be a much more easily obtainable data source
that would provide valuable information to the first responder community, Congress, and
the public. Such a program would also make it easier for outsiders to determine which
areas are improving their ability to communicate. Interested parties could then track the
outcome of interoperability grant money and determine if the millions of dollars spent
each year are having any real impact.
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Recommendation 4: Prepare now for a large increase in
interoperability funding once systems based on new standards
and spectrum become available in 2009
The Department of Homeland Security and Congress should recognize that the
completion of the Project 25 open standards, in concert with the release of new spectrum
in 2009, will constitute a technological leap forward for interoperable communications.
In the 2008 and 2009 budget, DHS should increase money for interoperability grants by
at least 25%.
As discussed in Chapter 3, Project 25 radios are currently available, but they only
implement one of the eight interfaces in the P25 standards suite. The other three critical
interfaces for interoperability will be finalized by the end of 2007. Systems that
implement these four key interfaces should be available for purchase in mid-2008 and
early 2009, right around the time that the 24 MHz of allocated spectrum will be released
for first responder use. A lack of spectrum and a lack of standards are the two remaining
major technical barriers to interoperability, and the release of this new technology will
overcome both of them. Therefore, many public safety agencies will want to upgrade
their communication systems to P25 systems that use the newly available spectrum. The
federal government must be prepared to accommodate a surge in funding requests.
In order to adequately meet the increased demand for federal aid, DHS should
prepare to fund an increased number of interoperability grants to state and local
responders in the 2008 and 2009 budgets. Considering that this increase will occur during
the first year of a new presidential administration, Congress will be more likely to
approve additional appropriations, especially if interoperability becomes an issue in the
2008 elections. Barring that, this money will have to come from other grant programs
within the Department of Homeland Security. While transferring money will always
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necessitate security tradeoffs, interoperability should take funding priority because of the
unique opportunities posed by the convergent timing of these two technical advances.
Recommendation 5: Establish a National Interoperability Goal
The President of the United States should announce a national interoperability
goal that sets a specific deadline for a measurable result. One possible goal that is both
logical andfeasible is, "By the year 2010, every public safety agency that operates in a
region on the Urban Areas Security Initiative list will have incident command-level voice
communication with every other public safety agency - local, county, state, tribal and
federal - that operates in that region."
The policies, activities, and dollars of the federal government are increasing
regional interoperability in pockets and spurts. In order to have true national progress,
though, there needs to be a big, long term, audacious national goal. This goal should be
simple, easy to understand, and should clearly state what the national policy on achieving
interoperability will be and how the nation will know if it's been achieved or not. The
details can continue to be handled as they have been for the past few years, but the
overarching vision must be made anew. In short, interoperability needs a statement akin
to President Kennedy's famous "We choose to go to the moon" speech, in which the
President set both a big, audacious goal and a short timeline with which to achieve it.
The statement proposed above is not the one that has to be used, but it is a good
starting point for a number of reasons. First, it sets a clear and relatively tight timeline for
the goal to be achieved. With only 3.5 years until 2010 at the time of this writing, there is
enough pressure to make all levels of government address this now. Second, it defines the
set of regions it is looking at as those on the Urban Area Security Initiatives list. This list,
complied by the Department of Homeland Security, identifies the most sizable or risk-
prone cities in the nation. While interoperability is not just a homeland security-related
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problem, it is the fear of future terrorist attacks and natural disasters that will motivate
this effort. Finally, the statement describes exactly what must be achieved. Every public
safety agency, from firefighters to local police to paramedics to the state police and
National Guard, needs to be involved. The communication must at least exist between the
incident commanders from each agency at the scene, much as it was in the RapidCom
pilot that was detailed in Chapter 3.
Achieving this goal will not be easy, nor will it ultimately be an end-state for
interoperability. Cities not on that list will still need interoperable communications, and
even the regions that are addressed will need more comprehensive interoperability. But as
this goal is achieved, a new one can be set and pursued. In this way, the quest for national
interoperability will be constantly overcoming remaining obstacles, driven towards
ideals, and following a path forward.
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